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IN MEMORIAL 
 
On January 21, 2003, 
52-year-old Ontario 
Conservation Officer  
Walter Ceolin was 
working as a member of 
a crew conducting aerial 
moose surveys in a 
remote Ontario location 
when their helicopter encountered mechanical 
difficulties. The pilot attempted to make an 
emergency landing, however the helicopter rolled 
over and crashed into the bush a short distance 
from a railroad siding.  
 
Loggers working nearby witnessed the accident 
and were on the scene almost immediately, but 
there were no survivors. Also killed in the crash 
were two Resource Management technicians, 
Bruce Stubbs (39) and Chantelle Walkey (27), and 
the chief helicopter pilot Michael Maguire (50); 
all were from the Ontario Ministry of Resources. 
Officer Ceolin had come in to work on his day off 
to fly that day. He had 25+ years with the 
Ontario Ministry of Resources and is survived by 
his companion and a son. 
 
The above information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
available at www.odmp.org/canada 
 
POLICE FRIEND NOT A 
LAWYER: RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
RESPECTED 
R. v. Webber, 2002 BCCA 692 
 
As a result of being stopped at a 
roadside check, the accused was 
required to provide a breath 
sample and was advised of his  
 
right to a lawyer. He requested to speak to his 
friend, a police sergeant.  The officer attempted 
to persuade him to try and call a lawyer, but the 
accused would only blow if he could call his 
sergeant friend. The officer declined to facilitate 
the call and the accused was charged and 
convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing his right to counsel 
protected under s.10(b) of the Charter had been 
violated when the police failed to provide him with 
a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. He 
suggested they did not facilitate his request in 
obtaining the legal advice he wanted before they 
accepted his refusal. This, he contended,  
afforded a reasonable excuse not to provide a 
breath sample and he should have been acquitted. 
In dismissing the appeal, Justice Huddart for 
British Columbia’s top court concluded that the 
sergeant friend was not a lawyer and consequently 
there was no need for the officer to permit the 
contact the accused sought.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ACCUSED NOT RESPONSIBLE 
FOR TOW BILL 
R. v. Wellington, 2003 ABQB 12 
 
An Alberta Court of Queen’s 
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company has no right to collect an 
outstanding storage bill from an 
accused after his vehicle was seized by police and 
stored at a private compound. The vehicle was 
seized on the basis that it was purchased with 
funds fraudulently obtained from a bank. The 
accused had plead guilty to the fraud and his 
motor home was eventually returned to him. At 
the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the 
 judge to order that the accused pay $11,497 in 
compensation to the tow company for the 
outstanding storage bill. The accused argued that 
the police seized the motor home and they should 
pay the cost of storage.  
 
In dismissing the claim for compensation, Justice 
Sanderman concluded the tow company would have 
to seek relief elsewhere, such as a civil claim 
against the police or otherwise negotiate a 
settlement. The police department entered into a 
private contract with the tow company for the 
storage of the motor home and the accused was 
not a party to that contract.  Furthermore, there 
were no Criminal Code provisions that would 
permit the relief the tow company was seeking. 
For example, the requirements of s.489.1 (1) were 
ignored. Therefore, the accused was not 
responsible for the bill.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
WARRANTLESS VEHICLE 
SEARCH VALID AS AN 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
R. v. Power, 
[2002] No. 1302A-00513 (NfldPC) 
 
The accused was observed by a 
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Charter on the basis that the arrest was unlawful 
and the warrantless vehicle search that followed 
was unreasonable. He argued that an arrest based 
solely on the odour of marihuana was improper 
because the “olfactory observation” alone could 
not provide reasonable grounds. 
 
The Arrest 
 
A warrantless arrest under s.495 of the Criminal 
Code requires that the arresting officer possess 
the requisite reasonable grounds. This imports a 
subjective belief (the officer’s perspective) 
justified from objective criteria based on the 
circumstances, including an officer’s training and 
experience. In finding the arrest lawful, Justice 
Gorman of the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Provincial Court stated: 
 
In this case, I conclude that a reasonable person 
placed in the position of [the officer] would have 
concluded that reasonable and probable grounds 
existed for [the accused] to be arrested. If [the 
officer] had failed to do so after smelling what he 
genuinely believed to be freshly burnt marihuana, he 
would have been seriously derelict in his duties and 
in his obligation to investigate possible breaches of 
the law. 
 
The Search 
 
Although a warrant is generally a precondition to a 
V
Fpolice officer pulling a trailer 
without any lights, an offence 
under highway traffic legislation. 
fter stopping the vehicle, the officer smelled a 
airly strong, fresh odour of marihuana coming 
rom it. He concluded the marihuana had been 
ecently smoked and arrested the accused for 
ossession of a controlled substance, advised him 
f his right to counsel, and placed him in the rear 
f the police cruiser. The officer then searched 
he accused’s vehicle and found 2 grams of 
arihuana in a “kit bag” behind the driver’s seat. 
e was subsequently charged with possession of a 
ontrolled substances. 
n a pre-trial application the accused sought to 
ave the evidence excluded under s.24(2) of the 
constitutional search, there are exceptions to this 
rule including warrantless searches incidental to 
arrest. This search power, although requiring 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest, “does not 
require that the officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the search will result in the seizure of 
evidence”. However, the search must be 
undertaken for a legitimate purpose connected to 
the circumstances of the arrest. Valid reasons 
include searching for safety or to find evidence.  
In concluding that the search of the accused’s 
vehicle was justified as an incident to arrest, 
Justice Gorman stated: 
 
In this case, [the officer’s] search of the vehicle 
was conducted for a valid reason which was 
connected to the arrest. He was searching for 
olume 3 Issue 2 
ebruary/March 2003 
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arrest. It must be recalled that [the accused] was 
arrested because of the officer’s belief that he had 
possession of a prohibited substance. This is not for 
instance, a case in which a search for drugs 
occurred in relation to an arrest for an unrelated 
matter…The search was not conducted in an abusive 
fashion nor was the purpose of the search related 
to any improper motives. 
 
The evidence was untainted and could be used at 
trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
HIGHWAY SAFETY INCLUDES 
QUESTIONING ABOUT 
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION  
R. v. Peterson, 2002 SKQB 489 
 
The police stopped the accused 
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Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA) for 
justification.   
 
After reviewing current case law, Justice Smith 
concluded that random vehicle stops pursuant to 
the HTA for highway safety are arbitrary under 
the Charter, but saved by s.1. Highway safety  
“includes determination of the sobriety of the 
driver”. This extends to requests of the driver to 
perform sobriety tests as well as asking a driver 
if they have consumed alcohol. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
$500 REMEDY FOR NON-
DISCLOSURE OF POLICE NOTES 
R. v. Kelln, 2003 SKPC 1 
 
A Saskatchewan Provincial Court 
Judge awarded an accused 
V
Fto determine if he was licensed, 
his vehicle was registered, and 
to check his sobriety. He 
roduced his licence and vehicle registration on 
equest. A passenger was also observed trying to 
ide a bottle of beer under his foot. When asked, 
he accused acknowledged he had been drinking. 
he officer made a roadside screening device 
emand and the accused failed. He was arrested, 
ead his right to counsel and police warning, and 
iven the breathalyzer demand. He subsequently 
rovided breath samples over the legal limit.  
e was convicted at trial, but appealed to the 
askatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench arguing 
hat the certificate of breath analysis was 
nadmissible under s.24(2) of the Charter because 
t was the product of an arbitrary detention 
ontrary to s.9. He suggested that the officer 
as initially entitled to stop him under 
askatchewan’s motor vehicle legislation, but the 
ontinuation of the detention became arbitrary 
nce he produced the requested documents. Thus, 
t the time the officer asked the question about 
lcohol consumption the accused was unlawfully 
etained and the officer could not rely on 
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failed to provide a police 
officer’s notes in a timely manner, breaching the 
prosecution’s obligation of full disclosure. The 
accused was charged with impaired driving and his 
lawyer wrote Crown requesting disclosure. The 
police report was provided, but not the officer’s 
notes. During a subsequent conversation with the 
Crown his lawyer asked for any police officer’s 
notes, which were ultimately provided 11 months 
after initial disclosure was requested.  
 
In the Court’s ruling, Justice Snell noted that the 
“Crown has an obligation to disclose all relevant 
information that may be helpful to the defence, 
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in order to 
ensure that the accused may make full answer and 
defence, as guaranteed by section 7 of the 
Charter”. Justice Snell stated: 
 
The Crown acknowledged that in many cases the 
investigating officers are the only witnesses and 
therefore their notes are the only "statements" 
which are available. The police report is prepared 
from those notes. According to the authorities the 
notes are considered part of the Crown file and 
3
 are subject to disclosure whether the police have 
provided them to the prosecutor or not. 
 
The Crown argued that the notes need only be 
disclosed if the defence asks for them. In 
rejecting this submission, the Court held: 
 
In my view the practice of the Regina Prosecution 
Office of failing to provide police officers' notes 
upon receipt of an initial request for disclosure and 
requiring the defence to subsequently request 
such notes specifically constitutes a failure to 
comply with its disclosure obligations. The Crown 
agreed that the notes are relevant and would be of 
assistance in making full answer and defence. 
Accordingly, in order to fulfill its obligation to 
provide full disclosure the Crown should be 
obtaining those notes from the police with the 
police report as a matter of routine, so that they 
can be provided to the defence in all cases where a 
request is made for disclosure. 
 
As a result of his s.7 Charter breach, the accused 
requested a judicial stay of proceedings as an 
appropriate remedy under s.24(1). Justice Snell 
found a stay would be too extreme under the 
circumstances but awarded the accused $500 
because of the extra expense suffered when he 
had to make additional court appearances to deal 
with the Crown’s breach of disclosure. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
DOES NOT WARRANT STAY 
R. v. Larsen, 2003 BCCA 18 
 
In 1978, the partially nude body 
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had attended the party. The semen was found to 
match the accused’s DNA, but the hairs found in 
the victim’s hand had already been destroyed 
because the police had concluded they were of no 
value as evidence at this time; there was no 
scientific methods of proving positive 
identification. The accused was charged with 
murder. 
 
At his trial the accused argued that he had 
consentual sex with the victim before her death 
and she must have died from accidentally choking 
on his semen or was strangled by another unknown 
person(s). He further submitted that the 
destruction of the hair denied him the 
opportunity to prove his innocence. The hairs may 
have provided DNA evidence exonerating him and 
he was therefore denied his Charter right under 
s.7 to make full answer and defence as well as his 
right to a fair trial under s.11(d). As a remedy 
under s.24(1) of the Charter he asked for a 
judicial stay of proceedings or, at minimum, a 
specific direction that the hairs found in the 
victim’s hand were neither his nor the victim’s.  
 
The trial judge refused both requests. First, he 
concluded that the destruction of the hairs was 
not malevolent. It was made out of an honest and 
reasonable belief that they were worthless as 
evidence and the police did not deliberately 
attempt to undermine the accused’s defence or 
the trial fairness. Secondly, although a DNA 
analysis of the hairs might have assisted the 
accused, it was just as likely the results may have 
been neutral or adverse to him. Any prejudice to 
the accused making full answer and defence could 
V
Fof a 16-year-old deceased 
female was found after she had 
disappeared from a party held in 
 farmer’s field. She had a clump of human hairs 
n her hand and semen in her mouth, larynx, and 
n her sweater. At the time, an expert in hair and 
ibre analysis concluded the hairs were 
nconsistent with belonging to either the victim or 
he accused. Twenty years later with the 
mergence of DNA testing as a reliable 
nvestigative tool, the police re-examined the 
omicide. They obtained DNA samples of men who 
be mitigated by considering the frailties in the 
investigation when weighing the reliability of the 
evidence or by the accused calling the expert who 
initially examined the hairs. Finally, the trial 
judge held that directing himself that the missing 
hairs were neither the accused’s nor the victim’s 
was treading into the area of evidentiary weight, 
as opposed to admissibility. He was not prepared 
to accede to this request because it was not his 
role to make the most favourable finding for the 
accused to the exclusion of all other possibilities.  
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 The accused appealed his conviction for first-
degree murder to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in failing to grant a remedy for 
the police destruction of the hairs. In rejecting 
this ground of appeal, Justice Smith writing for 
the Court stated: 
  
The Crown’s duty to disclose all relevant material 
in its possession or control to the defence is 
imposed because an accused has a right to make 
full answer and defence, which is one of the 
principles of fundamental justice guaranteed by s. 
7 of the Charter…. The duty includes a duty to 
preserve relevant evidence.  Nevertheless, when 
evidence is lost or destroyed, there is no breach of 
the s. 7 disclosure obligations if the Crown 
satisfies the trial judge that the loss or 
destruction was not due to unacceptable 
negligence.  Whether there has been unacceptable 
negligence is a factual inquiry that depends upon 
the degree of relevance of the evidence and the 
reasonableness of the police conduct that resulted 
in its destruction or loss.  Moreover, even where 
the Crown has satisfactorily explained the loss of 
evidence, in the extraordinary case where the loss 
is so prejudicial to the accused that it impairs his 
right to a fair trial, a judicial stay of proceedings 
may be granted.  However, in such extraordinary 
cases, the accused must demonstrate actual 
prejudice to his fair trial right. (emphasis added, 
references omitted) 
 
The trial judge had properly considered in his 
Charter analysis whether the prejudice to the 
accused’s defence was irreparably damaged or 
could otherwise be remedied. Furthermore, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed that the 
self-direction concerning the origin of the hairs 
was not appropriate in the circumstances. The 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
“People may not remember what you did, or what 
you said, but they will always remember how you 
made them feel”. Author unknown 
CLASS 89 GRADUATES 
 
The Police Academy is pleased to 
announce the successful graduation 
of recruit Class 89 as qualified 
municipal constables on February 7, 
2003. 
 
ABBOTSFORD 
Cst. Martin Ellis-White 
Cst. Shaun Nagel 
Cst. Ian Uhryn  
 
 
DELTA  
Cst. Dennis Mah 
 
 
NEW WESTMINSTER 
Cst. John Grantham 
 
VANCOUVER 
Cst. Derek Cain 
Cst. Jeffrey Campbell 
Cst. Helder Confeiteiro 
Cst. Andrew Copus 
Cst. Kathy Crowther 
Cst. Calvin Davis 
Cst. Calvin Ewer 
Cst. Martin Formanek 
Cst. Adam King 
Cst. Justin Leung 
Cst. Rebecca Matson 
Cst. Dirk Odendaal 
Cst. Gregory Paxton 
Cst. Gerald Proctor 
 
 
Congratulations to Cst. Ian Uhryn 
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R(Abbotsford), who was the recipient 
of the British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police Shield of Merit 
for best all around recruit 
erformance in basic training. Cst. Gerald Proctor 
Vancouver) received the Abbotsford Police 
ssociation Oliver Thomson Trophy for 
utstanding physical fitness. Cst. Rebecca Matson 
Vancouver) received the Vancouver Police Union 
xcellence in Academics award for best academic 
est results in all disciplines. Cst. Adam King 
Vancouver) received the British Columbia 
ederation of Police Officers Valedictorian award 
or being selected by his peers to represent his 
lass at the graduation ceremony. Cst. Calvin Ewer 
Vancouver) was the recipient of the Abbotsford 
olice Recruit Marksmanship award for highest 
ualification score during Block 3 training (50/50). 
r. Phil Crosby Jones, former Police Academy 
irector and current Director of the British 
olumbia Special Olympics Law Enforcement Torch 
un, was the keynote speaker at the ceremony. 
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 NO CHARTER BREACH 
RESULTING FROM IN HOME 
ARREST  
R. v. Petri, 2003 MBCA 1 
 
Police officers responded to a 
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identity of the driver nor whether alcohol was 
even involved. She found that “while the officers 
acknowledged that the driver’s actions were 
consistent with that of an impaired driver, there 
were a number of other rational explanations for 
the manner of driving observed”.   
 
1
 
V
Fcitizen’s 911 call of a vehicle 
being driven erratically. The 
caller was able to provide a 
etailed vehicle description including a licence 
late number, but was unable to describe the 
river. Two officers attended the registered 
wner’s address and found a vehicle matching the 
escription parked in the driveway. The officers 
alked onto the driveway and touched the warm 
ood of the vehicle suggesting it had been driven 
ecently. They proceeded to the primary entrance 
f the residence and knocked on the door. The 
ccused, dressed in his nightclothes, answered 
he door, confirmed he was the registered owner 
f the truck, and stepped back allowing the police 
o step inside.  
hile speaking to the accused the police 
bserved symptoms of impairment including blood 
hot eyes, a strong odour of liquor, leaning against 
he wall for support, and stumbling on one of the 
tairs. An officer formed the opinion the accused 
as impaired and asked him if he had been the 
perator of the vehicle. The accused responded 
hat he had and was then arrested. He was 
ermitted to get dressed while accompanied by 
he officers and was transported to the police 
tation for breathalyser samples, which were over 
he legal limit.  
t trial1, Manitoba Provincial Court Justice Harvie 
oncluded the initial police entry onto the 
roperty was proper under the implied licence 
octrine because they entered onto the property 
or the purpose of communicating with the 
ccupant(s), not for the purpose of securing 
vidence against the homeowner. At the time the 
olice knocked on the door they did not know the 
                                                
 See R. v. Petri, (2001) 22 M.V.R. (4th) 108 (ManProvCt) 
However, the trial judge found that the police 
violated the accused’s s.8 rights when they made 
their warrantless entry into the dwelling house 
“without invitation or real consent”. She did not 
think “that it is acceptable or sufficient for the 
police to rely upon an ‘implied consent’ to enter a 
dwelling house”. Furthermore, they arrested him 
inside his home without a specialized warrant as 
required by R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13. As a 
result of the s.8 Charter breach, Justice Harvie 
excluded the breathalyser readings under s.24(2).   
 
The Crown appealed directly to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal under s.830 of the Criminal Code 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
finding that the police violated the accused’s s.8 
rights when they entered his home and arrested 
him without the appropriate warrant. Justice 
Kroft, writing for the unanimous Manitoba Court 
of Appeal agreed with Justice Harvie that the 
initial police entry onto the property and up to 
the door to knock was proper and did not exceed 
the common law implied licence rule. He stated: 
 
I begin my substantive comments by emphasizing 
the limited amount of information that the two 
officers had when they first arrived at the 
address of the registered owner. They had no 
description whatsoever of the person who had 
been driving the truck; did not know if the house 
was the driver's home; and had no idea whether 
the erratic driver was the truck owner, a family 
member or an unrelated third person. 
Furthermore, they had no way of knowing if the 
driver was even in the house and did not know 
anything about his state of sobriety. They were in 
fact just beginning the investigation of a reported 
offence.  
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With respect to the entry into the residence, 
Manitoba’s top court reversed the trial judge’s 
findings. In Justice Kroft’s view the lower court 
 judge erred when she concluded the police 
violated the accused’s rights by entering his home 
with his implicit consent and by arresting him 
without a specialized entry warrant. The Appeal 
Court held: 
 
Once the officers had passed through the door 
and onto the stair landing, the evaluation of their 
conduct must be addressed, while keeping in mind 
that they were police officers within a private 
dwelling and had no warrant. We must also 
recognize, however, that at this point in time, the 
police had absolutely no more information about 
the identity of the erratic driver than they had 
when they first approached the house and the 
person who met them at the door was certainly not 
an accused. There was no reasonable ground on 
which to charge or arrest him. What the trial 
judge described as taking place inside the door was 
still nothing more than part of the continuing 
investigation conducted without coercion…  
 
Once the police officers spoke to the person that 
met them at the door, received his confirmation 
that he had, in fact, been the driver and observed 
his physical appearance and unsteady gait, they 
had sufficient evidence to conclude that he had 
indeed been the driver of the truck that had been 
reported as driving erratically and that he was 
likely impaired. He was thereupon charged and 
arrested for impaired driving. He was allowed to 
dress, escorted to the cruiser car and transported 
to the police station for a breathalyzer test.  
 
The evidence shows that the police respected the 
accused's privacy in his dwelling by knocking on the 
door and waiting for him to answer. Their tentative 
entry into the interior landing followed the implicit 
consent from the accused as he backed away from 
the open door and talked to them.  
 
It is true that any implied invitation may be 
negated where the police enter the residence 
without the express or reasonably assumed 
consent of the occupant. However, there is nothing 
to nullify consent in the evidence that was before 
the court in this case. If the police are present for 
the lawful purpose of conducting an investigation 
by communicating with the occupant, they can 
continue the communication unless and until the 
occupant makes known that his cooperation has 
been withdrawn.  
 
In the case at bar, the accused never did change 
his reaction. To the contrary, he permitted the 
police officers to enter the landing and responded 
to their questions with informative answers. 
(references omitted) 
 
And further: 
 
I must repeat that when the police officers first 
entered the accused's home, they were still 
engaged in an open-ended investigation based on 
the apparent invitation that had been given to 
them. They had no grounds for an arrest 
(warrantless or otherwise), and did not obtain 
reasonable grounds until they had observed the 
condition of the accused and until he had 
voluntarily acknowledged that he had just been the 
driver of the truck. Thus, the implied consent 
asserted by the Crown was simply the accused's 
consent for the police to enter his residence in the 
course of conducting an investigation, not for the 
purpose of making an arrest.  
 
In any event, had the entire conversation occurred 
outside the doorway rather than a step or two 
inside, the grounds for arrest would still have 
crystallized only after the accused confirmed that 
he was the driver and the police had made note of 
his impaired condition.  
 
The officers could have made the arrest just as 
easily outside the doorway as inside on the landing. 
Thus, far from being the pivotal factual component 
in this case, the entry of the police onto the 
landing was quite incidental to the legal issues at 
play. The ultimate arrest was justifiable as a 
reasonably associated purpose arising out of the 
communications between the accused and the 
police in the course of an investigation conducted 
pursuant to an implied invitation and without 
suggestion of coercion.  
 
Although the accused did not expressly invite the 
police inside, such as asking them to “Come in”, he 
did step back allowing the police to enter and 
continue their investigation. This was valid implicit 
consent. Justice Kroft stated: 
 
If there was consensual entry into the dwelling of 
the accused as part of the police investigation, and 
if the subsequent arrest was based upon the 
acknowledgment made by the accused on the 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
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 landing and on the obvious signs of impairment, 
then R. v. Feeney has no application and there is no 
issue of warrantless arrest. In our case, there was 
no reasonable ground for arrest until after entry 
had been granted and the investigation had been 
completed. 
 
The entry and arrest was ruled lawful. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
JUSTIFY WARRANTLESS DRUG 
ENTRY 
R. v. Phommaviset, 2003 BCSC 81 
 
A police officer received 
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found a locked room from which they could hear 
the sound of fans. The police were satisfied that 
no one was in the locked room and therefore did 
not enter it. They exited the house and re-
established surveillance. These observations were 
reported to the investigating officer who included 
them in his ITO, which at the time was still 
unfinished.  As it turned out, the garbage bags 
only contained household trash. A search warrant 
was subsequently obtained and a grow operation 
was found in the locked room as well as documents 
in the name of the accused in the house. 
 
During the voire dire to determine the 
admissibility of evidence on charges of unlawful 
production and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, the accused argued that there were 
V
Finformation from an unknown 
informer that he had observed 
marihuana plants and grow lights 
n the basement of a house rented by the 
ccused. The officer believed he had reasonable 
rounds and began to prepare an information to 
btain (ITO) a search warrant while three other 
lainclothes officers in unmarked police cars were 
ent to secure the perimeter and conduct 
urveillance of the home. These officers were 
naware of the specifics of the information but 
new that the residence was the site of a 
uspected marihuana grow operation. About half 
n hour after their arrival the police observed 
hree men, including the accused, exit the house 
arrying six large, full garbage bags to a van 
arked in the driveway and enter it.  
elieving the bags contained marihuana, the men 
ere arrested by police for production of a 
ontrolled substance. The accused was searched 
nd a set of keys was found in his pocket. 
hinking it was prudent to clear the residence for 
ersons and eliminate potential threats and 
revent the loss or destruction of evidence, the 
olice entered using the keys. They announced 
heir presence and conducted a cursory search of 
he residence. In the basement they observed 
allasts, transformers, capacitors, and venting 
ose in a laundry room, could smell marihuana, and 
insufficient grounds to justify his arrest. 
Furthermore, the warrantless search of his 
residence was made to gather more incriminating 
information to support the ITO the police knew 
would not be enough to satisfy a justice. Finally, 
he suggested that if the police were really looking 
for people in the house they would have entered 
the locked room to search it. Thus, he maintained 
the search was not incidental to a lawful arrest, 
was unreasonably conducted, and was an 
infringement of his s.8 Charter rights.  
 
On the other hand, the Crown claimed that there 
were reasonable grounds to make the arrest. The 
attending officers believed the investigator 
preparing the ITO had reasonable grounds and 
their observations of the three men carrying the 
garbage bags enhanced this. Their decision to 
enter the home was to protect officers at the 
scene and to preserve evidence, both exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless search 
under s.11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA).  
 
Reasonable Grounds to Arrest 
 
Although it was agreed upon at trial by both the 
Crown and the accused that the information of 
the unknown informant was insufficient by itself 
to provide reasonable grounds, British Columbia 
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 Supreme Court Justice Dillon noted an arresting 
officer need only have a subjective belief that is 
objectively justifiable. The test is one of 
“reasonable probability”. In this case, Justice 
Dillon accepted that the arresting officer’s 
testimony that he subjectively believed 
reasonable grounds existed. Although he did not 
know the specific information provided by the 
informant, the arresting officer assumed the 
investigator had reasonable grounds to swear a 
warrant. This, along with the three men exiting 
the target residence with garbage bags the 
officer concluded contained marihuana, provided 
the officer’s subjective belief. 
 
These grounds were also reasonable from an 
objective point of view. In finding the arrest 
proper, Justice Dillon stated: 
 
Objective reasonable and probable grounds also 
existed. Reliance can be placed on the informant’s 
information in the circumstances where the 
information is compelling and corroborated by 
police investigation prior to arrest….  Here, 
although the informant was unknown to police, the 
information was compelling in that it identified a 
specific street address and renter.  The report of 
the informant was corroborated by the 
observation of the garbage bags reasonably 
believed to contain marijuana.  This gave 
credibility to the tip.  In these circumstances, the 
tip of the informer is sufficiently reliable to form 
part of the reasonable and probable grounds for 
arrest.  Accordingly, the arrest of the accused was 
lawful. (references omitted) 
 
The Entry 
 
Section 11(7) of the CDSA allows the police to 
search a residence without a warrant if the 
conditions for obtaining a warrant exist but it 
would be impracticable to obtain one because of 
exigent circumstances. Having already concluded 
there were reasonable grounds, Justice Dillon 
examined whether exigent circumstances existed. 
She described such circumstances as follows: 
 
"Exigent circumstances" exist if immediate action 
is required for the safety of the police or if there 
is an immediate danger of the loss, removal, 
destruction or disappearance of the evidence if 
the search is delayed … Exigent circumstances 
involve the subjective belief of the police as well 
as an objective basis for the belief….  The exigent 
circumstances asserted by police must be 
objectively reasonable….  In R. v. McCormack [143 
C.C.C. (3d) 260], exigent circumstances were 
established because the police had a reasonable 
basis to believe that a female seen in an 
automobile was the accused’s girlfriend, that she 
had access to his apartment, and that there was 
evidence in the apartment that could be destroyed. 
In R. v. Feeney [[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13], however, 
exigent circumstances did not exist when there 
was no apparent jeopardy to safety of the police 
and when police had no knowledge of evidence at 
the premises but only suspected or had a hunch 
that evidence might be found. 
 
In this case, there were not exigent circumstances 
arising from a concern for safety of the police or 
the public. Although [one of the attending 
officers] testified that weapons are often found 
at marijuana grow operations, he did not suggest 
that he believed that weapons were present at 
[the accused’s residence].  If any safety concerns 
existed, the officers falling back away from the 
house and maintaining a watch over the premises 
could have met them.  With respect to a concern 
for the destruction of evidence, it was reasonable 
to assume that there would be documents and 
other evidence at the location based upon the 
information from the informant and the 
observation of the garbage bags.  It was also 
reasonable to assume that there could be others in 
the house when there was no information on the 
number of suspects, the element of surprise was 
gone, and the officer had been unable to determine 
that there were no others in the house.  … [The 
attending officer’s] expectation of documentary 
evidence to link the accused or others to the 
residence and to the grow operation was realistic 
and not just based upon a hunch or suspicion given 
all of the circumstances.  There were exigent 
circumstances arising from concern for the 
destruction of evidence.  (references omitted)  
 
Section 11(7) of the CDSA justified the 
warrantless police entry and the accused’s s.8 
Charter rights were not violated.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
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 BEHIND THE EIGHT BALL2: 
CHARTER PROOFING YOUR 
SEARCHES 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
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at another person. 
 
2
v
3
4
5
Q
6
 
What is a reasonable expectation? 
 
What will constitute a “reasonable” expectation of 
privacy depends on the totality of the 
circumstances and fluctuates with the context7. 
V
Frecognized the underlying 
purpose of s.8 is "to secure 
the citizen's right to a 
reasonable expectation of 
privacy against government 
ncroachments3". This privacy guarantee may be 
xpressed in two ways. It can be expressed as a 
reedom from 'unreasonable' search and seizure, 
r alternatively, as an entitlement to a 
reasonable' expectation of privacy4.  
rivacy, in the constitutional context, relates to 
rivacy interests of persons, not of places5. In 
his sense, the privacy interest of an individual 
nd protection provided by s.8 is not triggered 
nless the individual can establish a personal 
xpectation of privacy in the area intruded upon 
y the state. For example, two people could be 
fforded different protections by s.8 even 
hough they were both found in the same car 
earched by police6.  
he personal right to be secure from 
nreasonable search or seizure may not be 
sserted vicariously and a person may not rely on 
he violation of a third party’s rights to benefit 
hemselves. A person who is aggrieved by an 
nreasonable search through the introduction of 
vidence obtained from the search of a third 
arty’s premises or property has not had their 
ersonal s.8 right violated unless they themselves 
an establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
n relation to the place searched or thing seized. 
enerally, a third party may not claim prejudice 
                                                
 Webster’s New World Dictionary (1995) defines “behind the eight ball” as “in a 
ery unfavourable position” 
 R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (S.C.C.). 
 Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at p.108. 
 See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.), Edwards v. the 
ueen  (1996), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.). 
 R. v. Belnavis [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 
For example, at border crossings the reasonable 
expectation of privacy is lower than otherwise 
available in a wholly domestic setting8. In assessing 
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, many factors will be considered. These 
include9: 
 
• the person’s presence at the time of the 
search; 
• possession or control of the property or place; 
• ownership of the property or place; 
• historical use of the property or item; 
• the ability to regulate access, including the 
right to admit or exclude others from the 
place; 
• the existence of a subjective expectation of 
privacy; 
• the objective reasonableness of the subjective 
expectation.   
 
How far does privacy extend? 
 
There are essentially three privacy zones 
recognized under s.8 of the Charter10: 
 
• personal; 
• spatial; and 
• informational. 
 
Personal privacy zones involve the expectation of 
privacy in the bodily integrity of a person. When 
the search or seizure "relates to the body, rather 
than the home, for example, the standard 
[warranting state intrusion] is even higher than 
usual11". The more serious an affront to a person’s 
dignity, the greater their privacy interest. 
                                                 
7 R. v. Briggs (2001) Docket:C34813 (Ont.C.A.) 
8 R. v. Simmons [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495. 
9 R. v. Edwards (1996) 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.) 
10 R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 per La Forest. 
11  R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 per La Forest at para.35. 
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 Similarly, the more invasive the search, such as a 
body cavity search, the greater the assault on a 
person's dignity12, thus the greater the 
justification required. Personal searches may vary 
in degrees of intrusiveness: 
 
• frisk or pat down; 
• strip or skin; 
• body cavity; or 
• bodily substance (biological samples/body 
tissue) 
 
A person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
relative to their person will be assessed in 
context. For example, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced to a custodial term of 
incarceration will expect a reduced privacy 
interest in comparison to a person who is a 
suspect but has not yet been charged. The inmate 
is no longer presumed innocent, is subject to strip 
searches, body cavity searches, and constant 
supervision, and thus has a lesser expectation of 
privacy than others not in that circumstance13.   
 
Spatial, territorial, or geographical privacy 
zones involve a person’s expectation of privacy in 
a place or surroundings such as a home, vehicle, or 
business. Like personal privacy zones, an arrest 
significantly reduces the expectation of privacy 
and the search of a motor vehicle, for example, is 
less an affront to a person's liberty, dignity, and 
bodily integrity than a minimally intrusive frisk 
search authorized incidental to arrest14. 
 
People have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
within the sanctity of their dwelling house, 
whether it is an apartment unit, a detached 
home, or a hotel room15. The principle that "a 
man's home is his castle" is a bulwark for the 
protection of the individual and the sanctity of 
the home affords the individual a measure of 
privacy and tranquility against the state16. There 
is no place where persons can have a greater 
expectation of privacy than within their dwelling 
house and the unauthorized presence of agents 
of the state in a home is the ultimate invasion of 
privacy17. This includes a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the approach to their home18. Thus, 
when the object of an unreasonable search is a 
dwelling house, any violation of the Charter will 
be rendered all the more serious19. However, 
there will be occasions where the principle of 
inviolability of the home will yield to the 
legitimate requirements of law enforcement. 
                                                 
12 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 per Lamer J. 
13 R. v. Briggs (2001) Docket:C34813 (Ont.C.A.) 
14 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 per Bastarache J. 
15 R. v. Love (1995) 102 C.C.C. (3d) 393 (Alta. C.A.) 
16 R. v. Silveira [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 per La Forest at para.41. 
 
A person may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a premise other than a dwelling house 
such as a business. For example, the area of a 
business establishment open to the public would 
not be protected by s.8 of the Charter during 
regular business hours. A business "that is open to 
the public with an implied invitation to all members 
of the public to enter has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy from having a police officer 
enter the area of the premises to which the public 
are impliedly invited"20. However, private or non-
public areas such as an office in the back of the 
same establishment would be afforded some 
protection under the Charter21.  
 
An individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when driving a vehicle on a public roadway, 
but this interest is lesser than one would be 
afforded in their dwelling house or office22. 
Operating a vehicle is a highly licensed, regulated, 
and inspected activity. Vehicles operate on public 
roadways, are parked and serviced in public places, 
and their interiors are highly visible. However, the 
driver of a vehicle, either as the owner or with the 
permission of the owner to drive it, has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to 
the vehicle and its contents.  A passenger may or 
may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                 
17 R. v. Silveira [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 per Cory J. at para. 140 and 148. 
18 R. v. Evans (1996) 104 C.C.C (3d) 23 (S.C.C.) 
19 R. v. Lamy (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d)  558 (Man.C.A.)  at p.570. 
20 R. v. Fitt (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 341 affirmed (1996) 103 C.C.C. (3d) 224 (S.C.C.), 
R. v. Spindloe 2001 SKCA 58. 
21 R. v. Kouyas  (1994) 136 N.S.R. (2d) 195 (N.S.C.A.) 
22 R. v. Higgins and Higgins (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 206 (Que.C.A.) at p.212. 
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 in a vehicle, depending on the relevant facts 
surrounding their presence in it23. 
 
Informational privacy zones involve the 
expectation of privacy in confidential personal 
information retained by others. The use of such 
information is restricted to the purpose for 
which it was initially divulged. For example, a 
person who provides personal information to a 
physician for medical purposes has a privacy 
interest in that information. The personal medical 
information may not be freely provided to the 
police by medical staff.  Similarly, where the 
police unreasonably seize hair and blood samples, 
the accused maintains a privacy interest in the 
information pertaining to these bodily samples24. 
In considering whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information, many 
factors must be assessed in balancing societal 
interests in protecting individual dignity, 
integrity, and autonomy with the government’s 
interest in advancing its goals, notably those of 
effective law enforcement25. 
 
How is a s.8 breach proven? 
 
In establishing a s.8 Charter infringement, the 
person alleging the breach must satisfy the court 
on a balance of probabilities that their personal 
right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure was violated. There is no obligation on the 
Crown to establish that the search and seizure did 
not violate s.826.  Although the onus is on the 
individual to prove the breach, they need not 
necessarily give evidence. In some cases a breach 
will be readily established on the basis of evidence 
led by the Crown27. In proving their personal right 
was violated, a person must demonstrate the 
following three elements: 
 
                                                 
23 R v. Belnavis [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 
24 R. v. Borden (1994) 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.) 
25 R. v. Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) 
26 R. v. Hammil (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 338 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
dismissed [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.), also R. v. Feldman (1994) 91 C.C.C. (3d) 256 
(B.C.C.A.) per Hinkson J.A. leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed 93 C.C.C. (3d) 575 
(S.C.C.) 
27 R. v. Butler (1995) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to Supreme Court 
of Canada refused 105 C.C.C. (3d) vi.. 
1. the search and/or seizure was conducted by 
a government agent (the police). The Charter 
controls state action, not the behaviour of 
persons in the private sphere28. However, 
private persons may be converted into actors 
of the state when they take an active role by 
performing a function at the direction of the 
police.   
 
2. the person had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The accused must show that their 
personal reasonable expectation of privacy was 
breached by the state conduct29. 
 
3. the search was unreasonable. Simply 
demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure 
occurred satisfies this requirement. The police 
will then be required to rebut this 
presumption. Alternatively, the accused may 
choose to challenge the law, the manner of the 
search, or that police failed to comply with the 
substantive or procedural requirements of the 
authorizing law. 
 
Rebutting the warrantless presumption? 
 
Although there is no constitutional warrant 
requirement, all warrantless searches are prima 
facie unreasonable30. Rather than justify a search 
after it occurs (subsequent validation), the 
warrant requirement serves as a means of 
preventing unjustified searches before they occur 
(prior authorization). When a warrantless search 
occurs, the police (Crown) bear the burden of 
justifying the search31. The warrantless/ 
unreasonable presumption may be rebutted 
provided the search was conducted in a reasonable 
manner pursuant to a constitutionally valid 
statutory or common law rule32. This 
reasonableness test acts as a template for 
assessing whether a search runs afoul of s.8 of the 
Charter. 
 
                                                 
28 R. v. Fitch (1994) 93 C.C.C. (3d) 185 (B.C.C.A.) at p.189. 
29 R. v. Belnavis (1996) 107 C.C.C. (3d) 195 (Ont.C.A.) at p.207. 
30 Hunter v. Southam (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) 
31 R. v. Lamy (1993) 80 C.C.C. (3d)  558 (Man.C.A.)  at p.562. 
32 R. v. Collins (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) 
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 Authorized by Law 
 
Under both the Charter and the common law, 
police "can only enter onto or confiscate someone's 
property when the law specifically permits them to 
do so33". The right of the police to search, without 
a warrant, is subordinated to the existence of a 
rule of law34. If a search is to be authorized by 
law, the following three elements must be met35: 
 
1. The police officer conducting the search must 
resort to a specific statute or common law rule 
that authorizes the search. For instance, if the 
police enter a house without the authority of 
statute or common law, they commit a 
trespass36. A departmental policy itself does 
not have the force of law37. However, a policy 
may be written in accord with the law and by 
satisfying policy requirements police will also 
be complying with the law. The true source of 
authority is the law, not policy. 
 
2. The search must be carried out in accordance 
with the procedural and substantive 
requirements of the authorizing law. The 
provisions of the statute or the requirements 
of the common law must be satisfied. A search 
not in compliance with the requirements is not 
a search authorized by law.  
 
3. The scope of the search must be limited to the 
area and those items for which the law has 
granted authority to search. For example, if 
the police are executing a search warrant they 
must only act within the scope and ambit of 
the warrant having regard to the description 
of the premises and the range and type of 
items listed in the warrant. The police may only 
search those areas that might reasonably 
contain the items specified in the warrant. If a 
search exceeds the boundaries recognized 
under the authorizing law, it is not valid to the 
extent that the search exceeds the limits.  
                                                 
                                                
33 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.) at para. 12. 
34 R. v. Higgins and Higgins (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 206 (Que.C.A.) at p.211. 
35 Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.) 
36 R. v. Silveria [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.) per La Forest at para. 50. 
37 R. v. Flintoff (1998) 126 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (OntC.A.), R. v. Nicolosi (1998) 127 C.C.C. 
(3d) 176 (Ont.C.A.), Caslake v. the Queen [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51 (S.C.C.), R. v. Kalin 
[1987] B.C.J. No.2580 (B.C.Co.Ct.) 
Constitutionally Valid Law 
 
If the law authorizing a search is itself 
unreasonable, any resultant search from that 
unreasonable law will also be unreasonable. The 
courts must determine if the authorizing law 
complies with the Charter.  If the court concludes 
that the law violates the Charter, the law will be 
ruled unconstitutional and will be of no force or 
effect.  
 
Reasonable Manner 
 
Legality alone will not save a search that is 
excessive in its execution38. A search authorized 
by a reasonable law may be rendered unreasonable 
by the manner in which the police physically 
conduct themselves during the search39. Generally, 
the police maintain exclusive control of how a 
search is conducted. Manner includes the nature of 
the search, the scope of the intrusion, the place in 
which the search was conducted, or whether it was 
abusive. The extent or intrusiveness of a search 
must be proportionate to the underlying objectives 
served by the search and the relevant 
circumstances of the situation. In contrast 
however, an unlawful search will not be 
retroactively rendered reasonable even though the 
search is conducted in an inoffensive fashion40.  
 
Abandonment41 
 
When a person voluntarily 
discards an item they 
relinquish their privacy 
interest in it; therefore s.8 is 
not triggered and police may 
gather the item without a war
caution must be taken when th
custody, as they have no choice
property into the exclusive contr
Therefore, such disposal in police 
be true abandonment. 
 
 
38 R. v. Greffe (1988) 41 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Alta.C.A.) per M
reversed [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755. 
39 R. v. Debot [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (S.C.C.) per Lamer J.  
40 R. v. Moran (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.C.A.) at p.24
41 see Volume 1 Issue 13 for a detailed review. 
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 COMMON LAW INTRUSIONS INTO 
PRIVACY 
de
if 
(s
I can search an arrestee 
and their immediate 
surroundings for safety 
and/or evidence related 
to my arrest. 
 
Implied Licence42 
 
Unless revoked by signage, 
words or otherwise, a person 
waives their privacy interest 
in the approach to their home 
for the purpose of persons, 
including the police, coming on to 
communicate with them. Implied l
officer from the sidewalk to the d
to a home’s occupants. However, i
the officer to engage in an affirma
evidence (eg. a sniff) if that is wh
in the first place. Conversely, 
entered to communicate and
gathers evidence, that is OK. 
 
Search Incident to Investigat
Detention43 
 
Under the common law the 
police are entitled to search 
persons they detain for 
investigative purposes 
provided the detention is 
initially justified (articulable 
cause and reasonably necessary) 
itself is limited in scope to a sear
upon a specific, real, and leg
concern to protect the offic
spontaneous, unplanned street in
the most part, these types of
involve the minimally intrusive 
protective frisk. Since the gen
constitutional standard for search
grounds, searches for evidenc
authority are not permissible. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 See Volume 1 Issue 1 for a detailed review 
43 See Volume 1 Issue 7 for a detailed review. 
Search Incident to Arrest44 
 
Under the common law a 
police officer has the 
right to search an 
arrested person and their 
immediate surroundings as 
an incident to their arrest. 
This power is first predicated on a lawful arrest 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
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(eg. s.495 Criminal Code). Further, the search 
must be incidental, or connected, to the arrest 
for safety concerns (weapons/escape aids) or 
evidence related to the reason of the arrest. 
Finally, the search must be physically conducted 
in a reasonable manner. For the most part, an 
independent belief the person has weapons or 
evidence on or about them is not required. 
However, in the case of strip searches, the 
officer requires reasonable grounds that the 
person has secreted a weapon or evidence on 
them. 
 
Plain View Seizure45 
 
The common law plain view 
seizure doctrine allows 
the police to seize items 
they visually observe from 
a position they are legally 
entitled to be.  This power is
only and does not authorize an
In other words, the police c
things and then claim they 
There are generally three pr
rule. First, there must be a 
the privacy area in question. 
legally entitled to be where t
saw the item. Second, the of
find the item through inadv
must be readily apparent, or 
the item is subject to seizure
reasonable grounds the item
evidence before they can seiz
is insufficient. 
 
44 See Volume 2 Issue 3 for a detailed review. 
45 See Volume 1 Issue 1 for a detailed review. Since I am already here 
lawfully, I can take what I
see without leaving to 
get a warrant.   
 a seizure authority 
 affirmative search. 
annot go looking for 
were in plain view. 
erequisites for this 
lawful intrusion into 
The officer must be 
hey were when they 
ficer generally must 
ertence.  Finally, it 
immediately obvious, 
. The officer needs 
 is contraband or 
e it. Mere suspicion 
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 Consent46  
 
I can search a person 
or their property with 
their voluntary and 
informed permission. 
A person can waive the 
protection afforded them 
by the Charter under s.8. In 
essence, the person is telling 
the police they are giving 
permission for an intrusion 
into their reasonable expectation of privacy. The 
legal test for consent is two-fold. First, the 
consent must be given freely and voluntary. This 
includes an awareness of the right to refuse a 
search, which can most easily be satisfied if the 
police inform the person of this fact. Secondly, 
the consent must be informed. This means the 
person must have sufficient knowledge to make 
their choice on whether to allow the police to 
search meaningful. This includes an awareness of 
the police conduct the person is consenting to 
(the scope of the search) and an awareness of the 
potential consequences of giving consent. They 
must have an appreciation of their position in 
respect of the investigation (eg. anything found 
may be used as evidence if that is the purpose of 
the search). Of course, the refusal or 
withdrawing of consent cannot by itself provide 
reasonable grounds to search without permission. 
To hold otherwise would be to allow the state to 
use a person’s exercise of their constitutionally 
protected right to privacy against them. 
I can enter private 
property if I reasonably 
believe it is necessary to 
protect people from 
death or injury 
Because I know the 
person I have the power 
to arrest is in the non-
dwelling, I can enter 
without a warrant if I first
announce. In the case of
a dwelling I must be in 
hot pursuit or have 
other compelling 
 
Protection of Life47  
 
exigencies. 
                                                
Where the state’s 
interest in effective law 
enforcement is so 
compelling that it 
outweighs an individuals 
right to privacy, such as 
saving a life or protecting someone from serious 
injury, the police are permitted to enter a 
premise to check on the welfare of the person, 
provided they first give proper announcement if 
appropriate under the circumstances. Proper 
announcement includes giving notice of presence, 
purpose, and authority. The focus of this search 
is on the endangered or injured person and does 
not permit entry simply to investigate an offence.  
Reasonable grounds for belief must be 
established.  
 
46 See Volume 2 Issue 4 for a detailed review. 
47 See Volume 1 Issue 11 for a detailed review. 
 
Similarly, in 911 hang up calls the police may enter 
to ascertain the welfare of the caller, provided 
some preliminary investigative steps are taken 
prior to entry.  The focus is on the caller 
(possible victim/injured person) and the police 
may enter to ascertain the nature of the 
emergency, which could be criminal, medical, or a 
cry for help in another non-police related 
emergent situation.  The fact is, the police are 
the first responders to enter these types of 
emergencies and once the crisis has been 
assessed, they will ensure the appropriate 
resources are summoned (eg. EHS, fire). Of 
course, if the police determine there is no 
emergency, their right to remain on the property 
ceases and they must leave or risk becoming a 
trespasser. 
 
Entry to Effect Arrest48 
 
The legal authority to 
arrest a person does not, 
by itself, justify an entry 
into a private premise to 
carry out the arrest. 
There is a recognized 
distinction between the 
police power to arrest and 
the police power to enter 
to effect it. At common 
law, the police may make a warrantless and non-
consensual forced entry into private property 
other than a dwelling house, such as a business, 
detached garage, barn, non-dwelling out building, 
land, or vehicle, to make an arrest provided the 
police officer has the authority to arrest, the 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe the 
person sought is within the premise to be entered, 
and proper announcement is made prior to entry49. 
                                                 
48 See Volume 1 Issue 6 for a detailed review. 
49 R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 at para. 24, R. v. Haglof 2000 BCCA 604. 
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 This includes notice of presence, purpose, and 
authority. However, forced entry without a 
warrant into dwelling houses to effect arrests is 
generally prohibited unless the interests of law 
enforcement outweigh the privacy interest in the 
home50. One exception to this rule is cases of hot 
pursuit51 (other circumstances include the suspect 
posing an immediate threat to arresting officers 
or the public, or immediate police action is 
necessary to prevent the loss of evidence52). 
 
OVERHEARD CONVERSATION 
BETWEEN PRISONERS 
ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. A.D., 2003 BCCA 106 
 
Following the robbery of a 7-11 
store by four females, the 
accused, a young offender, was 
arrested by police. On the first 
day of the trial the accused, along with two co-
accused, was transported from the youth 
detention centre to the courthouse. During the 
drive the transporting deputy sheriff overheard 
the accused tell another prisoner, “You should 
have seen the look on the guy’s face when we went 
into the store”. When asked why they committed 
the robbery the accused told the prisoner they 
“needed the money”. Furthermore, she responded 
that “cigarettes and a small amount of cash” were 
taken. While in cells a second deputy sheriff 
overheard the accused tell her co-accused, “let’s 
hire a hit man”. 
 
At trial, the inculpatory statements made by the 
accused and overheard by the deputy sheriffs 
were admitted at trial. These statements, along 
with other evidence, were sufficient to satisfy 
the judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused was guilty of robbery. She was convicted 
of the offence in Youth Court, but appealed to 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing, 
among other grounds, that the statements were 
inadmissible. She claimed that the “covertly 
intercepted” statements were obtained following 
breaches of her s.7 and s.10(b) Charter rights 
and that the requirements of s.56 of the Young 
Offenders Act (YOA) were not satisfied. 
Further, she contended that a youth must 
knowingly accept the risk of making statements to 
the police and since she was unaware she was 
being overheard she could not accept the risk.  
                                                 
50 R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, R. v. Golub (1997) 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.) 
51 R. v. Feeney [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13. 
52 See s.529.3 Criminal Code. 
 
On the other hand, the Crown suggested that the 
statements were not made to a person in 
authority, but were voluntarily made to another 
prisoner. Moreover, the statements were 
spontaneous utterances made at a time where the 
deputy sheriff’s could not reasonably comply with 
warning requirements of the YOA. 
 
In a unanimous judgment, Chief Justice Finch for 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the 
accused’s appeal. He concluded that the 
statements were spontaneous conversations 
unintentionally overheard by the deputy sheriffs. 
They were voluntary statements made to a fellow 
prisoner obtained by authorities through passive 
surveillance and were therefore admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
ADEQUATE OBJECTIVE 
FACTORS PROVIDE 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE TO 
JUSTIFY DETENTION 
R. v. Hyatt & Pawlak, 2003 BCCA 27 
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In the early morning hours two 16
masked men, one armed with a 
rifle, entered a convenience 
store and threatened the clerk 
with death while stealing money and cigarettes. 
The two men fled and the clerk immediately 
called 911, providing a suspect and clothing 
description. Two police officers were dispatched 
to the scene and were relayed the description 
provided by the clerk. After searching the 
immediate area of the robbery, the officers 
 broadened their search to a logging road and 
stopped a vehicle occupied by the two accused 
and a female driver, Ms. Bennett. After ordering 
them out, the police obtained statements from 
the three occupants without informing them of 
the reasons for the detention or of their right to 
counsel. Despite Ms. Bennett’s request to speak 
to a lawyer before answering questions, the police 
persisted. While searching the vehicle the police 
found coins and cigarettes in the glove box. This 
discovery, in conjunction with some of Ms. 
Bennett’s responses, provided reasonable grounds 
to arrest the occupants. Following the arrest, the 
police found several bills in the accused’s pockets. 
 
At the police station Ms. Bennett spoke to a 
lawyer and told the police she did not wish to talk 
until her lawyer could attend to see her. Ignoring 
her request, the police attempted to press and 
manipulate her to talk. Even against her wishes, 
the police called her mother to the police station 
to help make her cooperate. After 12 hours in 
custody and continually refusing to cooperate, Ms. 
Bennett succumbed to the pressure and provided 
a recorded statement where she confessed to her 
involvement with the accused and the robbery.  
 
The police subsequently obtained a search 
warrant for Ms. Bennett’s vehicle and seized the 
coins and cigarettes from the glove compartment 
and a shotgun and clothing from the trunk. All 
three vehicle occupants were charged with the 
robbery, but the charges against Ms. Bennett 
were stayed and she was subpoenaed to testify 
for the Crown. At the trial the accused were 
convicted on the evidence of Ms. Bennett as well 
as the real evidence discovered during the police 
investigation.  
 
Although they did not dispute their involvement in 
the offences, the accused appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing they were 
entitled to an acquittal, or at least a new trial, 
because evidence was improperly ruled admissible. 
Among other arguments, they suggested that 
because they and Ms. Bennett were arbitrarily 
detained (s.9 Charter), unreasonably searched 
(s.8 Charter), and had their right to counsel 
violated (s.10(b) Charter), the evidence should 
have been excluded under s.24(2).  
 
Arbitrary Detention 
 
At their trial, the accused Hyatt submitted that 
the initial vehicle stop was arbitrary and all the 
evidence flowing from the stop should be 
inadmissible under s.24(2). He pointed out that 
the officer agreed with defence suggestions on 
cross-examination she was only acting on a 
“hunch” or “suspicion”, therefore no articulable 
cause existed. However, in rejecting this 
argument, the trial judge found that the police 
had an objectively based “articulable cause” to 
justify an investigative detention. The 
investigation involved a serious crime occurring in 
a town of 30,000. The police had a limited 
description matching two of the vehicle occupants 
in age, gender, and race. The vehicle was found on 
a logging road, unusual at that time in the 
morning, and the time and location of the stop 
were close in proximity to the robbery. In the 
trial judge’s view, these factors were in the mind 
of the officer at the time of the stop and 
provided adequate objective grounds; a decision 
supported by the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal. This ground of appeal was rejected. 
 
Unreasonable Search 
 
In his appeal arguments, the accused Pawlak 
submitted that the trial judge erred when she 
concluded that he had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in Ms. Bennett’s vehicle or in the glove 
box and its contents. He argued that the judge 
gave insufficient consideration to his subjective 
expectation of privacy. He hid the items from the 
police in the glove box, he “owned” the items 
seized, and the location of the glove box was 
within his reach immediately in front of his seat. 
The Court of Appeal refused to interfere with 
the trial judge’s findings of fact and held that 
she had properly applied the relevant legal 
principles, including the totality of the 
circumstances test, when she found the accused 
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 failed to establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  
 
Right to Counsel 
 
Although the accused’s statements at the scene 
were ruled inadmissible by the trial judge because 
the police questioned them without advising them 
why they were detained or of their right to 
counsel under s.10 of the Charter, the accused 
Hyatt further suggested that both the evidence 
seized from the glove box and Ms. Bennett’s 
testimony also resulted from those violations. 
Thus, both the glove box items and the testimony 
was derivative evidence, undiscoverable but for 
the constitutional breaches and therefore 
inadmissible under s.24(2).  
 
The trial judge rejected this submission. She held 
that the police officer’s decision to search the 
vehicle was independent of the accused’s 
statements. There was no evidence that the 
interviewing officer told the searching officer of 
his conversation with the accused.  Although the 
accused’s rights under s.10 were breached, these 
breaches did not lead to the discovery of the 
items in the glove box and the search was not an 
inevitable consequence of the s.10 violations. 
Furthermore, the trial judge ruled that Ms. 
Bennett’s testimony was not derivative evidence. 
Her discovery as a potential witness occurred 
when she was found in the company of the two 
accused and preceded any Charter violations. 
Thus, her testimonial evidence was available under 
subpoena and was not obtained in a manner 
infringing the accused’s Charter rights. The 
British Columbia Court of Appeal also rejected 
this ground of appeal.  
 
 
Third Party Charter Breaches   
 
The trial judge was critical of police investigative 
tactics, particularly those employed against Ms. 
Bennett, and would have ruled her statements and 
the glove box evidence inadmissible against her. 
The police blatantly disregarded her rights, 
relentlessly pressured her to give a statement, 
and searched her vehicle with a defective 
warrant; defective because it was supported by 
information obtained in violation of her rights. 
The accused contended that since the glove box 
evidence and Ms. Bennett’s testimony were 
obtained from an unbroken chain of Charter 
breaches, they should also be allowed to rely on 
these violations to have the evidence ruled 
inadmissible against them under s.24(2). However, 
the trial judge concluded that the accused could 
not argue exclusion based on the breaches to Ms. 
Bennett’s rights; thus they had no standing to 
challenge admissibility. As Justice Smith of the 
Appeal Court noted, “Charter rights are personal 
and cannot be asserted by anyone except the 
person whose rights are violated”. In short, the 
accused could not benefit from the breaches to a 
third party’s (Ms. Bennett) rights.  
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and their 
convictions upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
REMOVING THE CONFUSION 
FROM STRIP SEARCHES 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
Personal searches vary in 
degree of intrusiveness. 
Strip or skin searches 
requiring the removal of 
an arrestee's clothing is 
greater an affront to 
human dignity than a frisk 
or pat-down search. As such, a greater 
justification will be required. In addition, the 
manner in which the search is carried out will be 
critically examined53.   In R. v. Golden 2001 SCC 
83, the Court adopted the following definition of 
a ‘strip search’: 
 
[T]he removal or rearrangement of some or all 
of the clothing of a person so as to permit a 
visual inspection of a person’s private areas, 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
February/March 2003 
18
                                                 
53 R. v. Morrison (1987) 35 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Bedford (2000) 143 
C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Ont.C.A.) 
 namely genitals, buttocks, breasts (in the case 
of female), or undergarments. 
 
Although a search incidental to arrest does not 
generally require reasonable grounds beyond the 
grounds necessary to support the arrest, a strip 
search is an exemption to this common law rule. 
Strip searches represent a significant invasion of 
privacy, and are often humiliating, degrading, and 
traumatic experiences. Before undertaking this 
type of intrusive search, the officer must possess 
reasonable grounds justifying the strip search 
independent from grounds justifying the arrest.  
Strip searches carried out as a matter of routine 
or policy, abusively, or for the purpose of 
humiliating or punishing the arrestee will be 
unreasonable. Furthermore, strip searches should 
be conducted at the police station unless there are 
exigencies requiring the search be conducted in 
the field.  
 
The following are a number of important points 
concerning strip searches: 
 
¾ The common law power to search incidental to 
arrest does include the power to strip search.  
 
¾ Although permissible as an incident to arrest, 
strip searches are presumptively unreasonable 
and the onus lies on the police to justify the 
strip search. 
 
¾ Strip searches must be conducted in a 
reasonable manner. The physical manner or 
method of the search must be carried out in a 
just and proper fashion. The search must not 
be abusive and the scope of the intrusion 
must be proportionate to the objectives of 
the search and other circumstances of the 
situation. In deciding whether the manner in 
which a strip search was conducted meets the 
constitutional requirements of s.8 of the 
Charter, the following questions provide 
guidance54: 
 
• Was the search conducted at the police 
station, if not, why? 
                                                 
54 see R. v. Golden 2001 SCC 83 
• Was the health and safety of all involved 
ensured? 
• Was the search authorized by a 
supervisor? 
• Was the officer the same gender as the 
arrestee? 
• Was the number of officers involved in 
the search reasonable? 
• Was the minimum force necessary used? 
• Was the search conducted in private so 
others could not observe? 
• Was the search conducted as quickly as 
possible? 
• Was the search conducted in a fashion 
that ensures a person is not completely 
undressed at any one time? 
• Was the search only a visual inspection or 
was there physical contact? 
• Was the arrestee provided the option of 
self-removal or medical assistance if a 
weapon or evidence is observed in a body 
cavity? 
• Was a proper record of the reasons and 
manner of search kept? 
 
¾ Strip searches are inherently humiliating and 
degrading regardless of the manner in which 
they are conducted and therefore cannot be 
carried out as a matter of routine or policy. 
Strip searches performed routinely or under 
policy will not be rendered reasonable unless 
there is a compelling reason justified in the 
circumstances.  
 
¾ There is a distinction between strip searches 
on arrest and strip searches related to safety 
in full custodial settings such as a prison. The 
appropriateness of routine strip searches of 
individuals integrated into a prison population 
cannot be used to justify strip searches of 
individuals briefly detained by police or held 
overnight in cells. Although police officers 
have legitimate concerns that short term 
detainees may conceal weapons, these 
concerns cannot justify routine strip searches 
of all arrestees regardless of the particular 
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 circumstances surrounding the arrest and 
must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
¾ Strip searches are to be generally conducted 
at a police station except in cases of exigent 
circumstances where the police have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the search 
is necessary in the field such as an urgency to 
search for weapons that could be used to 
harm the officer, others, or the arrestee. 
 
¾ A person should be provided the opportunity 
to remove items themselves or the assistance 
or advice of trained medical professionals 
should be sought to ensure material can be 
safely removed. 
 
¾ When the reasonableness of a strip search is 
challenged, the Crown (police) bears the onus 
of proving on a balance of probabilities that it 
was warranted: 
 
• In the case of strip searches in the field, 
the police must demonstrate reasonable 
grounds justifying the strip search, 
exigent circumstances, and that the 
search was conducted in a reasonable 
manner. 
 
• In the case of strip searches at the police 
station, the police must demonstrate 
reasonable grounds justifying the strip 
search and that the search was conducted 
in a reasonable manner. Exigent 
circumstances need not be proven. 
  
WARRANTLESS SEARCH FOR 
MISSING GIRL ON 
ANONYMOUS TIP 
UNREASONABLE 
R. v. Tymensen, 2002 ABPC 164 
 
The Alberta Provincial Court has 
v
against unreasonable search and seizure. Five 
days after a 5-year-old girl went missing from her 
home the police received an anonymous tip 
recommending that they search an old school 
house, which had been converted into an eight-
room rental premise, because the missing girl 
might be hidden there.  
 
With the assistance of the building 
owner/landlord and his keys, the police 
systematically searched each room to look for the 
girl. The last premises to be searched was rented 
by the accused. After receiving no response to 
their knocking, the landlord unlocked the door and 
the police entered, detecting an overwhelming 
odour of marihuana. In plain view they noted illicit 
drug items, firearms and ammunition. They also 
found two bedrooms. One was unlocked and 
contained approximately 120 small marihuana 
plants under lights. The other room was locked 
and the landlord did not have a key to open it. The 
police did not enter this room, choosing instead to 
apply for a search warrant.  
 
A search warrant was obtained and police entered 
the room and found a grow operation with an 
estimated value of $131,800. The missing girl was 
not located at the old schoolhouse, but the 
accused was subsequently charged with 
production, possession for the purpose of 
trafficking, and a firearms offence. Tragically, 
the missing girl was later found dead and her 
killer convicted of murder.  
 
Police Entry 
 
During the voire dire to determine the 
admissibility of evidence, Justice Jacobson noted 
that in this case there were two competing 
interests; the accused’s right to privacy and 
society’s interest in effective law enforcement. 
In most cases, individual rights outweigh society’s 
except in compelling circumstances. In Charter 
jurisprudence however, there is a presumption 
V
Fruled that the search of a 
residence for a missing girl 
based on an anonymous tip 
iolated the accused’s Charter right to be secure 
that all warrantless searches are unreasonable 
and the Crown bears the burden of justifying a 
warrantless search. In concluding that the search 
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 in this case was unreasonable, Justice Jacobson 
stated: 
 
Up to and at the time of entry into the residence, 
none of the four factors [justifying warrantless 
searches: exigent circumstances, indictable 
offence being committed in the dwelling, danger of 
imminent loss or destruction of evidence, or 
impracticability in obtaining a warrant] were known 
to or even in the minds of the police. The accused 
was not suspected of, nor were there any 
allegations of wrong doing of any kind on his part, 
or in relation to his premises. The sole focus of the 
police was to fulfill their duties in the 
comprehensive police and public search for the 
missing girl. They were doing so on their 
supervisor's instructions, which were based on an 
anonymous, vague, and unfounded public tip. 
 
It was urgent that the girl be found. In that sense, 
exigent circumstances did exist in relation to 
finding the missing girl. She had been missing for 
five days, under what the officer said were 
"suspicious circumstances". This vague comment is 
open to conjecture and speculation. Nevertheless, 
the girl's unexplained disappearance created an 
urgent and demanding situation. Responsible law 
enforcement necessitated, as a part of their 
official obligations and duties, that the police 
carry out a rapid, thorough, and systematic 
investigation including appropriate searches for 
the missing girl. However, the evidence does not 
convey any sense of actual urgency or necessity on 
the part of [the officers]. After they received 
their instructions at 2:00 p.m., four hours elapsed 
before their search commenced at 6:00 p.m. They 
didn't try to search the locked bedroom until 
approximately 8½ hours later. Their final focus was 
on drugs, not the missing girl. 
 
And further: 
 
The police ought to have known that their initial 
entry and search of the residence was beyond 
their investigative powers. At the relevant time 
there were no grounds to justify a warrantless 
entry under exigent circumstances to search for 
the missing girl. They were not acting in an 
appropriate manner and did not comply with the law 
relating to searches. This conduct goes to both the 
reasonableness and the seriousness of a breach of 
s.8 of the Charter. The Crown has not met the 
Collins criteria of reasonableness. 
 
After rejecting various authorities such as  
consent (by the landlord), the investigation of 
recent or in progress crimes, and emergency 911 
calls, Justice Jacobson held: 
 
The public expects, and the law mandates that the 
police act on reasonable and probable grounds 
before invading the sanctity of the home of any 
member of society. 
 
The entry by the police was not a valid intrusion. 
Notwithstanding their valid motive, the nature of 
their purpose was a fishing expedition in relation 
to a missing child. They did not make any proper 
inquiries of the landlord to confirm what authority, 
if any, he had to allow them to enter locked 
premises of his tenants. The police officers must 
have subjectively believed, and it must be 
established objectively, that they had reasonable 
and probable grounds to make the warrantless 
entry. Without reasonable cause, in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, the police engaged in a 
warrantless exploratory search without reasonable 
subjective or objective grounds. 
 
The police search did circumvent the law when the 
importance of finding the girl was improperly 
relied upon as the basis for creating self-serving 
exigent circumstances. 
 
There were no exigent circumstances in relation to 
the search itself, nor the accused himself, nor to 
his residence. The police had no reasonable 
grounds to enter the residence for any purpose, 
but did so without the consent or permission of 
the accused. The search warrant was based solely 
on the information obtained from the warrantless 
entry, the two matters are completely intertwined. 
 
If as a result of their investigations and their 
thoughts had turned to suspicion, then there were 
other investigatory techniques available, such as 
surveillance. 
 
In accordance with public policy, ab initio the 
police had the authority and the duty to 
investigate the tip " but whether they may enter 
dwelling houses in the course of such an 
investigation depends on the circumstances of each 
case… The lawful police authority at the accused's 
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 residence ended at the front door. There was no 
response. There were no reasonable grounds to 
enter the accused's residence. There was no 
nexus. The landlord did not have the authority to 
consent to the police entry. The police entered the 
residence in order to assist them in their search 
for the missing girl as a part of the overall police 
service investigation. The accused's s.8 Charter 
right to privacy and to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure was violated by the entry. That 
breach tainted the subsequent acts of the police, 
including their obtaining the search warrant and 
the search itself. 
 
 
As a result, the evidence was excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
“[T]he state of the law in Canada [is] that a 
warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable. 
No professional police officer can now claim to be 
ignorant of this fact….[T]he Supreme Court of 
Canada has made it quite clear that it is 
incumbent upon police officers to be familiar with 
decisions defining their powers55”. Justice Godin 
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2003 UPCOMING POLICE 
ACADEMY COURSES 
 
The Police Academy is 
pleased to announce that 
the following courses are 
now available for 2003. 
Police members wishing to 
attend any of these 
courses should first contact their departmental 
training officer to determine if they are eligible to 
register. A complete downloadable copy of the 
Police academy Training Calendar is available on-
line at http://www.jibc.bc.ca/police/f-police.html. 
 
BAC Datamaster C Certification  
(POLADV604) 
June 2-6 
October 6-10 (Island) 
Length: 5 days 
 
This course provides support with alcohol-related 
investigations through the use of the BAC 
Datamaster C instrument. Topics include breath-
testing theory, pharmacology, physiology, BAC 
Datamaster C functional overview, court 
simulations, breath-testing, impaired driving law, 
and legal procedures. 
 
Persons applying for this course should be a 
member of a recognized police agency, have two 
years investigative experience, including impaired 
investigations. Members should be in a position to 
utilize the training and not likely to be 
transferred to a specialty squad in the near 
future. A mature approach to law enforcement, an 
interest in and aptitude for technical aspects of 
law enforcement, and an ability to be an effective 
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itute 
witness are also recommended. 
 
Members previously designated in British 
Columbia who have not conducted a breath test in 
three years should consider taking this course. 
 
22
 Tactical Surveillance  
(POLADV646) 
March 31-April 4 (Island) 
September 8-12 
Length: 5 days 
 
This course provides plainclothes police officers 
who are assigned surveillance duties with the 
knowledge, skills, and procedures needed to 
conduct surveillance. Topics include 
communications, equipment, operational planning, 
surveillance techniques and practical exercises. 
 
Persons applying for this course should be a 
member of a recognized police agency assigned to 
a specialty unit and required to conduct 
surveillance as part of their daily operational 
assignment. 
 
Field Trainers 
(POLADV 661) 
April TBA 
October TBA 
Length: 4 days 
 
This course provides police officers who are 
assigned field training duties with the knowledge 
and skills required to train a recruit constable 
during the Block II field training period. Topics 
include block training overview, performance 
evaluation report summary, traffic studies and 
impaired investigations, legal update, personal 
style and leadership, coaching and counselling 
skills, training management plans, tips/ tactics/ 
techniques, progressive documentation, and 
correcting performance problems. 
 
Persons applying for this course should be 
“certified” municipal constables of a recognized 
police agency and currently or about to be 
assigned field training duties. 
 
 
Effective Presentations 
(POLADV 657) 
April 28-May 2 
September 22-26 
Length: 5 days 
 
Search & Seizure 
(POLADV 645) 
May 5-9 
October 20-23 
November 17-20 
Length: 4 days 
 
This course is for members of a recognized police 
agency who require additional training pertaining to 
the search warrant process. The course is 
designed to provide police officers with the 
knowledge and skills essential to conducting a 
lawful search or seizure. Topics include 
introduction to search and seizure, s.487(1) 
Criminal Code warrants, firearms and other 
weapons, warrants to enter a dwelling house, 
general warrants for unusual procedures, special 
warrantss, intercepting private communications, 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act searches, 
provincial statutes, and the search warrant 
application process. 
 
Persons applying for this course should be a 
member of a recognized police agency, have 
relevant investigative experience, and conduct 
searches and seizures as part of their daily 
operational assignment. 
 
Firearms Instructor 
(POLADV 624) 
May 12-16 
Length: 5 days 
 
Admin Skills 
(POLADV652) 
November 3-7 (Island) 
Length: 5 days 
 
This five-day course is for law enforcement 
personnel who are seeking promotion or who have 
recently been promoted to a supervisory position. 
The course is based on the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities related to the successful management of 
administrative tasks and activities. Much of the 
content covers “in-basket” style functions. The 
course has been identified as an elective for the 
Police Supervisors Certificate Program. 
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 COURT UPHOLDS FIRST DEGREE 
P.O. MURDER PROVISIONS  
R. v. Sand & Bell, 2003 MBQB 45 
 
The accused were charged with 
committing the murder of RCMP 
Constable Dennis Strongquill. 
They brought a motion in the 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench arguing that 
the provisions of s.231(4) of the Criminal Code 
automatically making the murder of a police 
officer acting in the course of their duties first 
degree regardless of whether it is planned or 
deliberate contravened s.7 (principles of 
fundamental justice) and s.9 (arbitrary 
detention/imprisonment) of the Charter. Thus, in 
their view it is of no force or effect and the 
Crown cannot rely on this presumptive provision in 
their case. After reviewing the statutory 
provision and case law from other provincial 
appellate courts, Justice Menzies concluded that 
the section did not violate the principles of 
fundamental justice nor would it subject the 
accused to arbitrary detention or imprisonment if 
convicted. The court held: 
 
In legislating section 231(4)(a) of the Code, 
Parliament has chosen to elevate murder of police 
officers to that of first degree murder.  Police 
officers are the front line of society's defence 
against crime.  I agree with the comment of 
counsel for the Crown that an attack on a police 
officer is an attack on society itself.  Parliament 
has deemed it necessary to clearly denounce the 
murder of a police officer. 
 
The constitutional challenge to the provision was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
 “PRICE OF BUSINESS” MORE 
COSTLY FOR DRUG DEALERS 
R. v. Tammark, 2003 BCPC 006 
 
The accused was involved in a 
undercover officer called the accused on his cell 
phone and arranged a meet to purchase drugs. 
The accused drove to the meeting place and a 
small amount of ecstasy was sold to the 
undercover officer. The accused was not arrested 
at that time but a few months later at which time 
he was again in possession of ecstasy.    
 
At the time of the accused’s arrest he was 
driving his 1990 Honda Civic, valued at 
approximately $4,000. In addition to his arrest, 
the vehicle was seized as offence-related 
property. 
  
The accused plead guilty to the charge of 
trafficking in a controlled substance contrary to 
s.5(1) of the Controlled Drugs & Substance Act 
(CDSA). During sentencing Crown submitted an 
order of forfeiture, under s.16(1) CDSA, for the 
accused’s vehicle as the Crown contended it was 
utilized to facilitate the accused’s drug 
trafficking. Under s.16(1) CDSA  a judge is 
permitted to order the forfeiture of offence 
related property when a person is convicted of a 
designated substance offence and the Crown 
applies for a forfeiture order and satisfies the 
court on a balance of probabilities that the 
property is offence related and the designated 
substance offence was committed in relation to 
that property.  
 
 
In order for the vehicle to be forfeited under 
s.16(1) CDSA, the court first had to consider 
whether the vehicle used by the accused 
satisfied the definition of "offence related 
property" found in s.2(1) of the Controlled Drugs 
& Substance Act.  
 
V
F
s.2(1) Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
"Offence-Related Property" means any property, within 
or outside Canada, 
(a) by means of which or in respect of which a 
designated offence is committed, 
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the 
commission of a designated offence, “dial a dope” scheme throughout 
the lower mainland. An 
olume 3 Issue 2 
ebruary/March 2003 
24
(c) that is intended for use for the purpose of 
committing a designated offence, 
but does not include a controlled substance or real 
 property other than real property built or significantly 
modified for the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of a designated offence. 
 
In finding that the vehicle was “offence related 
property”, the court stated: 
 
 It is hard to imagine a "dial-a-dope" operation such 
as this taking place without being facilitated by the 
use of a motor vehicle. The vehicle was, I conclude, 
on the balance of probabilities, instrumental to the 
commission of the designated offence. It is personal 
as opposed to real property.  
 
And further: 
 
Clearly the motor vehicle involved has not been 
altered or modified. Can it be considered merely 
incidental to the offence? I think not. Without the 
motor vehicle being utilized, the drug trafficker 
would be greatly restricted in his mobility. Sales 
would obviously be adversely affected.  
 
The court sentenced the accused to a $500 fine 
as well as the forfeiture of his vehicle  
 
Editor’s comments: “In Service: 10-8” would like 
to thank Sannich Police Constable Andy Stewart 
for this contribution to the newsletter. 
 
AERIAL ‘FLIR’ FLY-OVER 
REQUIRES WARRANT 
R. v. Tessling,  
(2003) Docket:C36111 (OntCA) 
 
The Ontario court of Appeal has 
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again nothing was revealed supporting the 
presence of a grow operation.  
 
It was decided the police would use an airplane 
equipped with a forward looking infra-red (FLIR) 
camera capable of detecting heat emanating from 
the exterior of a residence. Because marihuana 
grow lights give off an unusual amount of heat, 
the FLIR would be able to assist the police in 
determining whether there was a marihuana grow 
present. As a result of the fly-over, the FLIR 
pattern indicated heat emanations consistent with 
a grow operation. This information, in addition to 
the source information, was used to obtain a 
search warrant for the accused’s residence. As a 
result of executing the warrant, the police found 
a large quantity of marihuana, scales, bags, and 
weapons.  
 
At his trial the accused argued the use of the 
FLIR technology was an unlawful search and could 
not be used to support the warrant. Without the 
heat readings, the unreliable information from 
the sources was insufficient to justify the 
warrant. He suggested that since the warrant was 
invalid, the search was unreasonable and the 
evidence should be excluded. On the other hand, 
the Crown contended that the use of the FLIR 
was not a search, but an acceptable police 
surveillance tool. Ruling against the accused, 
Justice Thomson concluded that using the FLIR 
was not a search and the warrant was valid. Thus, 
the evidence was admissible.  
 
V
Fruled that an infrared flyover of 
a targeted residence violated 
the occupant’s s.8 Charter 
ights. The police began an investigation 
oncerning the accused, and another man, after 
hey had received source information that he was 
nvolved in the production and trafficking of 
arihuana. The police contacted the hydro 
uthorities, but learned the power usage was 
ormal. Suspecting the accused may have been 
ypassing the hydro meters, the police continued 
heir investigation using visual surveillance, but 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred. He 
maintained that the FLIR examination was a 
search that breached his reasonably held 
expectation of privacy in his home. Since the 
police did not have a warrant to conduct the 
FLIR, there were insufficient grounds remaining 
to properly support the issuance of a search 
warrant.  Hence, the search was unreasonable and 
the evidence ought to have been excluded. Again, 
the Crown argued that the use of the FLIR was 
simply surveillance, not a search. Further, they 
suggested that the heat detected did not reveal 
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 any intimate details about the occupants and 
therefore there was no privacy, or at most only a 
trivial interest, in the heat emanations.  
 
Unreasonable Search 
 
Justice Abella, writing for the unanimous Ontario 
Court of Appeal, held “the use of FLIR technology 
to detect heat emanations from a private home 
constitutes a search and requires, absent exigent 
circumstances, prior judicial authorization”. In 
recognizing that the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the activities he carried 
on in his residence, Justice Abella found the use 
of FLIR unreasonably intruded on that privacy 
interest. He wrote: 
 
First, the FLIR technology reveals information 
about activities that are carried on inside the 
home. While the technology measures heat 
emanating from the outer walls of the house, the 
source of those emanations is located inside. 
Moreover, the sole reason that police photograph 
the heat emanations is to attempt to determine 
what is happening inside the house. The fact that 
it is necessary for the police to draw inferences 
from the heat emanating from the external walls in 
order to deduce what those internal activities are, 
does not change the nature of what is taking place. 
The use of the FLIR technology was an integral 
step in ascertaining what was occurring inside the 
appellant's home. 
……… 
Secondly, I am satisfied that the FLIR technology 
discloses more information about what goes on 
inside a house than is detectable by normal 
observation or surveillance. In my view, there is an 
important distinction between observations that 
are made by the naked eye or even by the use of 
enhanced aids, such as binoculars, which are in 
common use, and observations which are the 
product of technology. 
……… 
In any event, I do not share the Crown's view that 
the FLIR reveals information that is in plain view 
and easily observable. A member of the public can 
walk by a house and observe the snow melting on 
the roof, or look at the house with binoculars, or 
see steam rising from the vents. Without FLIR 
technology, however, that person cannot know that 
it is hotter than other houses in the area or that 
one room in particular reveals a very high energy 
consumption. FLIR technology, in other words, goes 
beyond observation, disclosing information that 
would not otherwise be available and tracking the 
external reflections of what is happening 
internally. 
 
It is, it seems to me, overly simplistic to 
characterize the constitutional issue in this case 
as whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in heat emanating from a home. The 
surface emanations are, on their own, meaningless. 
But to treat them as having no relationship to what 
is taking place inside the home, is to ignore the 
stated purpose of their being photographed, that 
is, to attempt to determine what is happening 
inside that home. It would, I think, directly 
contradict the reasonable privacy expectations of 
most members of the public to permit the state, 
without prior judicial authorization, to use infrared 
aerial cameras to measure heat coming from 
activities inside private homes as a way of trying 
to figure out what is going on inside. 
……… 
The FLIR represents a search because it reveals 
what cannot otherwise be seen and detects 
activities inside the home that would be 
undetectable without the aid of sophisticated 
technology. Since what is being technologically 
tracked is the heat generated by activity inside 
the home, albeit reflected externally, tracking 
information through FLIR technology is a search 
within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter. 
 
The Court further went on to add that they were 
not prohibiting the use of FLIR technology for 
enforcing marihuana offences. However, any use 
absent exigent circumstances will require prior 
judicial authorization. Since the police did not 
have a warrant to conduct the electronic 
surveillance in this case, the accused’s s.8 Charter 
right to be secure against unreasonable search 
was infringed. 
 
Admissibility 
 
In holding the breach serious and excluding the 
evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter, the Court 
stated: 
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 The heat emanations measured by the FLIR are 
not visible to the ordinary viewer and cannot be 
quantified without the technology. The nature of 
the intrusiveness is subtle but almost Orwellian in 
its theoretical capacity. Because the FLIR's sensor 
cannot penetrate walls, it is true that a clear image 
of what actually transpires inside the home is not 
made available by the FLIR device. However, it is 
not the clarity or precision of the image which 
dictates the potency of the intrusiveness: rather, 
it is the capacity to obtain information and draw 
public inferences about private activities 
originating inside the home based on the heat 
patterns they externally generate, that renders 
the breach serious. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
PROPERTY LINE DOES NOT 
PROVIDE IMPAIRED DRIVER 
WITH A “HOME FREE” ZONE  
R. v. Maciel, 
[2003] O.J. No. 126 (OntCJ) 
 
A police officer attended the 
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Justice Duncan of Ontario’s Court of Justice 
disagreed. He summarized the argument 
presented as “based solely on the legal and 
constitutional significance of the officer going a 
few feet onto the [accused’s] property to conduct 
an investigation that he was otherwise fully 
entitled to conduct”. Justice Duncan concluded 
the accused’s driveway was not a “home free” 
zone giving refuge from police investigation into 
his conduct immediately prior to entry. In ruling 
that no s.8 search occurred he stated:  
 
In my opinion, it is not reasonable to regard the 
edge of one’s property as a moat that gives 
sanctuary from the type of interaction with the 
police that occurred here. The intrusion or entry 
onto the property was very minimal and was of the 
type that every homeowner expects to routinely 
occur.  
 
And further: 
 
[T]he police officer in the present case was not 
"taking a flyer" or acting on a mere whim or a 
hunch. He had solid information, that he confirmed, 
that gave him ample reason - and indeed imposed a 
duty on him - to investigate further.  He had 
V
Fregistered owner’s address after 
receiving a complaint about a 
possible impaired driver. While 
aiting outside the residence the officer 
bserved the suspect vehicle approach the house 
nd pull into the driveway and stop. The officer 
arked behind the vehicle and approached the 
ccused as he got out of the driver’s seat. After 
oting physical symptoms of impairment and 
eceiving an admission of the consumption of 
eer, the officer formed the opinion the accused 
as impaired and arrested him. He subsequently 
rovided breath samples in excess of the legal 
imit.  
t his trial the accused argued that the police 
ntry onto his private property and physical 
bservations made constituted a warrantless 
earch for investigative purposes under s.8 of the 
harter and were therefore presumptively 
nreasonable. Thus, he suggested the evidence 
hould be excluded and an acquittal should follow. 
articulable cause, at least, and maybe more.  This 
was sufficient to give the officer common-law 
authority to take investigative steps, although prima 
facie involving interference with a person's liberty 
or property, provided those steps were justifiable 
under the circumstances. In my view, the boundary 
of the officer's authority was not drawn by the 
defendant's property line but by the sliding scale of 
"justification" enunciated in the Waterfield test of 
common-law police authority. 
 
The innocuous entry onto the defendant's driveway 
and the non-intrusive investigation (observation of 
the defendant's condition and speaking to him) 
were plainly justifiable, particularly having regard 
to the absence of any practical alternative by way 
of warrant. …  No one could reasonably expect that 
a police officer with grounds to investigate a 
contemporaneous impaired driving allegation would 
not come onto the driveway to observe the 
driver's condition as he stepped from his vehicle. 
There was no reasonable expectation of privacy, 
and therefore no search within the meaning of 
section 8 of the Charter. (references omitted) 
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Even if he were wrong in holding that there was 
no search within the meaning of s.8, Justice 
Duncan said it would have nonetheless been 
reasonable. In this case, it would not have been 
feasible for the police to obtain a warrant to 
enter onto the property. He found “the exigent 
circumstances inherent in an impaired driving 
investigation fully justified the minor 
encroachment on the [accused’s] property”.  The 
evidence was admissible and the accused was 
convicted. 
 
BCSC EXAMINES PHOTGRAPHIC 
LINE-UPS 
R. v. Miller, 2003 BCSC 118 
 
An undercover officer attended 
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•
•
suspect should not look conspicuously 
different from the others; and 
• The procedure must be fair in testing the 
ability of the witness to recognize the 
suspect. 
 
Justice Romilly also examined the enquiry report 
authored by retired Supreme Court of Canada 
Justice Cory in the wrongful conviction of Thomas 
Sophonow. In that 2001 report, Commissioner 
Cory recommended the following photo line-up 
procedure, which Justice Romilly noted had been 
referred to with approval by Justice Arbour of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Hibbert 
(2002) 163 CCC (3d) 129 (SCC): 
 
• The line-up must contain at least ten 
subjects; 
• The photos should resemble as close as 
V
Fthe residence of the accused, 
knocked on the door, and 
purchased $40 worth of cocaine 
rom him. The officer did not know the accused 
nd the transaction took less than a minute. 
bout 30 minutes after the buy the officer 
icked the accused from a photo line-up 
onsisting of eight photos on a single sheet. At 
is trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
fficer also pointed the accused out as being the 
erson who sold her the cocaine and based this 
dentification partly on a small mole on his face.  
he accused testified he did not sell drugs to the 
fficer. Further, although he does have a mole on 
is face, he claimed he has a more obvious scar on 
is forehead, which was not referred to by the 
fficer.  Supreme Court Justice Romilly examined 
dentification evidence, in particularly the use of 
he photo line-up, and identified three 
rerequisites for a valid line-up: 
 The police must not indicate to the witness 
which person in the line-up is the suspect; 
 The selection of the other photos in the line-
up should be fair in terms of physical 
appearance (age, build, colour, complexion, 
costume, or any other particular) and the 
possible the witness’ description; 
• An officer not involved in the investigation 
should conduct the line-up; 
• The entire photo line-up procedure should be 
recorded on videotape, or at minimum 
audiotape, from the time the investigator 
meets the witness until the completion of the 
interview; 
• The photos must be presented sequentially, 
not as a group; 
• In addition to the audio or videotape, a form 
recording the witness’ and officer’s signature 
as well as any verbatim comments should be 
used; and 
• The police should not speak with the witness 
after the line-up about their identification or 
lack thereof. 
 
Justice Romilly was of the opinion that the 8 
picture photo line-up used in this case was “no 
longer acceptable”. He recommended that the 
police adopt the procedures outlined in the 
Sophonow report or risk their photo line-up 
evidence being excluded. Since this case 
preceded the Sophonow report and its 
recommendations, Justice Romilly did not throw 
out the line-up. However, the accused was 
nevertheless acquitted. Justice Romilly stated: 
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 … I have to warn myself on the frailties of the 
eyewitness evidence of [the officer].  The accused 
was an absolute stranger to her at the time she 
made this buy; she had less than a minute to note 
his appearance; she was unable to identify a major 
scar on the forehead of the accused as being 
present when she made the buy; and in-court dock 
identification is always considered to be very 
unreliable evidence. 
 
Apart from all of that, I have evidence from the 
accused that the Constable is mistaken about him 
being the person who sold her the drugs... 
 
He concluded there was a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the accused was the one who committed 
the offence and was left with no option but to 
acquit. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
DISCRETE RIGHT TO 
DISCLOSURE PROTECTED 
UNDER THE CHARTER 
R. v. Henkel, Guertin, & Scott, 
2003 ABCA 23 
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal has 
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that the Crown had an obligation to disclose all 
information available to it before the accused was 
called upon to make a plea. Although he did not 
order a stay, the judge found the accused’s 
disclosure rights protected under s.7 were 
breached and ordered the Crown pay costs. 
 
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench arguing there was no Charter 
breach and consequently that the provincial court 
could not award costs. The appeal was dismissed 
and the Crown appealed further to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other issues, that 
the accused’s s.7 rights were not violated. The 
Crown suggested that a breach of the right to 
disclosure only amounts to a Charter violation if it 
is so serious that it impairs the accused’s ability 
to make full answer and defence to the charges.  
 
In the Appeal Court’s opinion, there was a two-
step process. The first stage was determining 
whether there was a breach of disclosure. If 
there was, a second step involved assessing what 
remedy, if any, was appropriate. Remedies could 
range from nothing at all to include a stay of 
proceedings, a court order requiring disclosure, an 
adjournment, or an award of costs. If the remedy 
sought is a stay of proceedings, it will not be 
V
Fheld that there is a distinct s.7 
Charter right to disclosure and 
establishing that a person’s right 
o full answer and defence was compromised is 
ot necessary.  The three accused were charged 
ith impaired driving offences and made early 
equests for Crown disclosure, which did not 
ccur to their satisfaction. As a result, they 
rought applications before a provincial court 
udge for an order staying the charges.  
he original lawyer handling the cases testified to 
he problems with disclosure from Crown he was 
xperiencing. A Chief Crown Counsel testified 
hat only certain information was disclosed at the 
irst court appearance, regardless of the 
nformation possessed by the Crown, and the 
emainder was only provided if the person plead 
ot guilty. The provincial court judge concluded 
granted unless the disclosure breach was so 
serious as to impair the right to full answer and 
defence or resulted from serious Crown 
misconduct (which was not in issue).  
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY 
INSUFFICIENT TO RENDER 
CHARTER BREACH 
R. v. O’Donnell, 2003 NBQB 61 
 
Following his arrest for impaired 
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transported to the police station 
where he was placed in a small 
room with the door partially open and spoke to his 
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 lawyer. The accused testified he could hear police 
officers’ voices outside the room, but not their 
words. An officer testified he could not hear the 
accused’s conversation with his lawyer. The 
accused agreed to provide a breath sample and 
his readings were over the legal limit. At his trial 
he successfully argued that his right to counsel 
had been violated. The Provincial Court judge 
ruled that since it was theoretically possible that 
the police could have heard what was being said, 
the accused’s s.10(b) Charter right to counsel was 
breached. However, the trial judge admitted the 
evidence of the breathalyzer certificate under 
s.24(2).  
 
The accused appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Queen’s Bench arguing that the judge 
erred in admitting the evidence. In his view, the 
certificate should have been inadmissible under 
s.24(2). Although the Crown did not cross appeal 
the finding of a s.10 Charter breach, Queens’ 
Bench Justice Garnett agreed with Crown that 
“the theoretical possibility of…being overheard 
did not amount to a breach of his right to 
counsel”. In any event, the trial judge did not err 
in admitting the evidence of the certificate. 
Excluding it would more likely discredit the 
justice system than its admission. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
APPEALS TO CONSCIENCE OR 
MORALITY ARE NOT 
INDUCEMENTS 
R. v. Crockett, 2002 BCCA 658 
 
The accused was arrested for 
t
a
s
s
c
r
questions. A second conversation subsequently 
followed, however it was not recorded. The police 
felt that the presence of a tape recorder would 
interfere with the rapport building they sought  
with the accused.  
 
The sergeant told the accused he understood his 
lawyer’s advice in not talking to the police, but 
that was something a lot of lawyers say and a 
lawyer cannot see into a person’s heart. With 
that, the sergeant told the accused to think long 
and hard about the truth. When asked what 
sentence he would receive, the police said they 
could not speculate and it was for the courts to 
decide. In an attempt to appeal to the accused’s 
conscience and values, an officer told the accused 
at the end of the unrecorded conversation, “The 
truth is important and goes a long ways”. The 
accused agreed to provide a statement during the 
unrecorded conversation and he subsequently 
confessed during a recorded interview. The 
accused was convicted by a Supreme Court judge 
of sexual assault causing bodily harm and unlawful 
confinement. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing that his statement was 
not voluntary because it was induced by an offer 
of leniency, some of his statements were not 
recorded, and that the police attempted to 
persuade him to disregard his lawyer’s advice. 
 
Inducement 
 
Although the accused insisted his main motive for 
confessing was to obtain a lesser sentence, 
Justice Levine, writing for the unanimous British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, agreed with the trial 
V
Fthe sexual assault and 
confinement of a 16 year old girl 
as she was walking at school. At 
he police station he spoke to a lawyer and was 
dvised not to talk to the police nor provide any 
amples to them. As his clothing was removed and 
eized, a sergeant and a constable had a 
onversation with him. This interaction was 
ecorded, but the accused refused to answer any 
judge’s conclusion that there was no quid pro quo 
offer made to the accused by the police to get a 
confession. The officers made no suggestion they 
could intervene on his behalf or had any control 
over sentencing. Furthermore, the accused never 
requested them to help, generally or specifically. 
The accused felt remorseful, guilty, and 
disgusted with himself. In citing Supreme Court 
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 of Canada Justice Iacobucci in R. v. Oickle (2000) 
147 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.), Justice Levine stated: 
 
[S]uspects confess to crimes for a variety of 
motives, one of which might be the hope of a 
lesser sentence.  Other motives are guilt, which 
the [accused] stated to police was the reason for 
his confession, and the relief that one feels from 
telling the truth.  The question is whether the 
confession was induced by a promise or threat by a 
person in authority.  Appeals to conscience and 
morality are neither promises nor inducements 
that, in the absence of other circumstances, will 
result in the inadmissibility of a confession. 
 
Unrecorded Statements 
 
In some cases, the absence of a statement 
recording can raise a reasonable doubt about its 
voluntariness. Although a recording can assist a 
judge is assessing whether a confession is 
voluntary, there is no absolute rule requiring that 
a statement be recorded. In this case there was 
little dispute about the surrounding 
circumstances of the unrecorded interview, the 
words used, or their context. Here, the 
credibility and reliability of the statement could 
be assessed in the traditional way without the 
necessity of a recording.  
 
Persuasion to Disregard Lawyer’s Advice 
 
After facilitating consultation with counsel the 
police are entitled to question an accused 
provided they do not denigrate the integrity of 
the lawyer. In this case the police only suggested 
to the accused “that the advice he was given was 
general advice” while appealing to his conscience 
and the stress he was under. The accused 
understood he had a choice in speaking or not and 
did so because of guilt.  
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Fight the good fight” 1 Timothy 1:18 
DETENTION OF 
UNNANOUNCED ARRIVAL NOT 
ARBITRARY 
R. v. Nguyen, 2003 BCPC 0021 
 
Police obtained a search warrant 
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February/March 2003 for a residence with respect to 
theft of electricity. Upon 
attendance at the house a police 
fficer observed a grey minivan parked directly in 
ront registered to a person wanted on an 
utstanding arrest warrant for possession of 
arihuana for the purpose of trafficking. The 
olice entered the home to conduct their search, 
ut there were no occupants. A four room, 153 
lant marihuana grow operation was found in the 
asement. Shortly thereafter, the accused 
rrived in a vehicle and parked in the garage at 
he back of the home. He then walked to the 
ront door. An officer suspected he was the 
erson wanted on the warrant, stated “Police”, 
nd asked for identification. The accused 
roduced a driver’s licence with information 
atching the wanted party and was arrested and 
andcuffed. He was searched and a set of keys 
ound in his pants pocket unlocked the door to 
he residence. He was then informed of his 
harter rights.  
uring a voire dire, the accused argued that he 
as arbitrarily detained (s.9 Charter) and 
nreasonably searched (s.8 Charter). Justice 
aughan of the British Columbia Provincial Court 
isagreed. Not every encounter between a citizen 
nd a police officer is a detention. In this case 
here was no detention when the officer stated 
Police” and asked for the production of 
dentification. In Justice Maughan’s view the 
fficer properly arrested the accused on the 
utstanding warrant after his identification as 
he wanted person was confirmed. Moreover, the 
rresting officer “had concerns about an unknown 
ndividual arriving unannounced at the residence 
t a time when a search warrant was being 
xecuted”. Together with the knowledge of the 
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 outstanding warrant and the van parked in front 
of the house, articulable cause existed for the 
officer to ask the accused to identify himself. In 
finding no Charter infringements, Justice 
Maughan stated: 
 
I find once [the officer] determined the identity 
and date of birth of Mr. Nguyen from his driver's 
license, he then had reasonable grounds to arrest 
him on the outstanding warrant. Thereafter, he 
was entitled to search him subsequent to that 
lawful arrest and upon finding keys in his 
possession, it was reasonable for him to pass them 
onto his fellow officer for the purpose of 
furthering their investigation at the premises 
being searched. The evidence found by the 
officers, to wit the keys, were found subsequent 
to a lawful arrest and consisted of real evidence. 
The accused was given his s.10 Charter Rights, 
which is his right to contact and instruct a lawyer 
and it was intended that he would be allowed to 
pursue that a short time later when he was at the 
police station. There was no attempt to obtain any 
statement from him at any time. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
INTERCEPT UNLAWFUL: USE OF 
ROOM DIRECTED BY POLICE  
R. v. Mojtahedpour, 2003 BCCA 22 
 
Following a fatal shooting at a 
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interrogated and reiterated that he and the 
murder suspect had been elsewhere at the time 
of the shooting.  
 
During the homicide investigation the police had 
obtained a judicial authorization to intercept 
private communications, including those between 
the accused and his parents. Both were named 
parties in the authorization. These interceptions 
were permitted at various locations including the 
accused’s home. In the early morning following his 
arrest the police contacted the accused’s parents 
and suggested they attend the detachment. At 
the same time, the accused was told his parents 
were attending the detachment and he would be 
provided the opportunity to speak to them in a 
room. However, unbeknownst to the accused or 
his parents the police had wired the room so the 
conversation could be intercepted and tape 
recorded. While speaking to his parents, the 
accused admitted he had been with the murder 
suspect at the homicide scene and that he had 
lied to the police. He was charged with attempting 
to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of 
justice by making false statements to the police 
during the investigation. The trial judge found the 
intercepted communication lawful and convicted 
the accused. 
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, 
V
Fmovie theatre the police 
interviewed the accused who was 
an acquaintance of the suspect in 
he homicide. The accused lied to police and told 
hem he was at another location with the suspect 
hen the shooting occurred. After more 
nvestigation including an undercover operation, 
he suspect was subsequently arrested for the 
urder. In an effort to establish the truth from 
he accused and use him as a witness, the police 
e-interviewed him. The police attended his home 
o persuade him to come to the police detachment 
oluntarily. He agreed and was transported to the 
etachment by police. His parents also drove to 
he detachment but were advised to return home 
y the accused. The accused was then 
that the conversation with his parents was 
unlawfully intercepted. Although the 
authorization allowed the police to intercept 
communications “at any other premises, either 
mobile or stationary…resorted to or used by the 
persons [listed]”, the accused submitted he was 
“brought to” the room in the detachment. It was 
suggested that this was not within the 
parameters of “resorted to” or “used by”. Thus 
the evidence should be excluded under s.24(2). 
On the other hand, the Crown argued the 
conversation was lawfully intercepted and even if 
it was not it should nonetheless be admissible 
under s.24(2).  
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 Justice Hall, writing the majority judgment, 
concluded that the interception went beyond the 
parameters of the authorization. Although the 
authorization itself was facially valid and not 
overly broad, it could not be interpreted to cover 
this circumstance. Justice Hall stated: 
 
 
The [accused], who was acknowledged to be 
detained, was placed in the room to talk to the 
parents. I think it would be a linguistic stretch to 
say that in these circumstances, the site of the 
interception was a place being “resorted to” or 
“used by” the targets of the authorization.   
 
The majority ordered a new trial, leaving it for 
the new trial judge to consider admissibility 
under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
Although agreeing with the majority that the 
intercept was unlawful, Justice Newbury did so 
for a different reason. In her view, the police 
must have reasonable grounds to believe that 
the room would be used by a targeted person at 
the time they activated the listening device; 
the fact the person(s) did resort to or use the 
facility in question is not sufficient. The police 
only knew the accused and his parents would be 
using the room because they directed them to 
do so. Except for this suggestion, there were no 
reasonable grounds to believe they would use it. 
Justice Newbury concluded that if “the police 
manoeuvre suspects into places or facilities for 
the express purpose of intercepting 
statements, without any evidence justifying an 
expectation that the target would otherwise 
have used or resorted to the location or 
facility”, an “unreasonable delegation of 
authority to law enforcement officers and an 
unacceptable violation of privacy” results. 
Justice Newbury also ordered a new trial. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“If you really enjoy your job you’ll never work a 
day in your life”. Author unknown. 
 
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ACT ARRIVING SOON  
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
April 1, 2003 is the date on 
which the new Youth
Criminal Justice Act 
(YCJA) is scheduled to 
become law and replace 
the Young Offenders Act 
(YOA). This article will 
examine the operational impact of the new 
legislation on the front line officer and provide 
supplemental information of interest to law 
enforcement, such as sentencing procedures.  
 
 
Definitions 
 
Under the new YCJA the age of a youth remains 
unchanged. A young person remains a person 
between the ages of twelve (12) and seventeen 
(17) inclusive. A child is under twelve (12) while an 
adult is a person who is neither a young person nor 
a child (eighteen (18) years of age and older).  
 
Child:   < 12 years 
Young person:  12-17 years 
Adult:   18 + years 
 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
Further to the right to counsel 
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detained under s.10(b) of the 
Charter, young persons continue 
to have the additional right to 
retain and instruct counsel 
without delay and to exercise 
that right personally at any stage of proceedings 
(s.25(1) YCJA). This includes during any 
consideration to use an extrajudicial sanction. 
Furthermore, s.25(2) also requires every youth 
upon arrest or detention to be advised by the 
police without delay of the right to retain and 
instruct counsel and to be provided an opportunity 
to obtain counsel.   
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 STATEMENTS 
 
Obtaining admissible statements is a cornerstone 
of a good police investigation. Properly gathered 
statements, including confessions from youth, 
may make the difference between a conviction 
and an acquittal. The following is a summary of 
the new provisions under the YCJA highlighting 
the evidentiary rules when obtaining statements 
from a youth.   
 
Admissibility 
 
Many of the rules under the YOA concerning the 
taking of statements remain unchanged, although 
the wording is slightly different. Under s.56 of 
the YOA special rules governed the taking of 
statements by a person in authority from a youth. 
These conditions were in addition to any rules 
relating to the taking of statements from accused 
persons in general. In short, the rules concerning 
statements from adults plus the added 
protections provided youth must be adhered to. 
Section 146 of the new YCJA is the s.56 YOA 
counterpart. Under s.146, a police officer taking a 
statement (oral or written) from an arrested or 
detained youth, or from a youth the officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe committed an 
offence, must: 
 
¾ Clearly explain to the youth in 
age/understanding appropriate language that: 
 
• the youth is under no obligation to provide 
a statement; 
• any statement made by the youth may be 
used as evidence against them ; 
• the youth has the right to consult counsel 
and a parent, an adult relative, or any 
other appropriate adult they choose 
(except a co-accused or other person 
being investigated for the same offence); 
and 
• any statement made by the youth must be 
made in the presence of the person(s) 
they consult unless they desire otherwise. 
 
¾ If the youth chooses to give a statement, 
they must be provided a reasonable 
opportunity to make it in the presence of the 
person they consult. 
 
Spontaneous Utterances 
 
If a police officer receives a statement made 
spontaneously by a youth when the officer did not 
have a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
requirements outlined above, failure to fulfill 
these requirements does not render the 
statement inadmissible (s.146(3) YCJA). 
 
Waiver 
 
If a youth waives their right 
to consult a lawyer or other 
adult, the waiver must be 
recorded on video tape, 
audio tape, or in writing 
(signed by the youth) 
(s.146(4) YCJA). Section 56 of the YOA did not 
allow audio taped waivers and is new to the YCJA. 
Also new to the YCJA is a provision that allows a 
youth court judge to exercise discretion in 
admitting a youth’s statement where there is a 
technical irregularity in complying with the waiver 
requirements and the judge is nonetheless 
satisfied the youth voluntarily waived their rights 
(after being properly informed of them) and the 
admission of the statement would not bring the 
principle that a youth is entitled to enhanced 
procedural protections into disrepute (ss.146(5) & 
(6) YCJA). This allows for voluntary statements 
to be ruled admissible as evidence despite a minor 
legal technicality, something that was not 
available under the rigid technical rules of the 
YOA. 
 
Duress 
 
Like the YOA, statements made under duress to 
persons who are not persons in authority may be 
ruled inadmissible by the court (s.146(7) YCJA).   
 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
February/March 2003 
34
 FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
Section 113 of the YCJA 
s
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p
community programs, or referral to extrajudicial 
sanctions (formal measures authorized by the 
Attorney General or other designated government 
V
Fallows the application of the 
Identification of Criminals 
Act (ICA) to youth, provided 
an adult could be 
fingerprinted and 
photographed under the 
ame circumstances. Operationally this means 
hat a youth may be treated the same way as an 
dult for the purposes of the ICA and the 
ccompanying fingerprinting and photographing 
rocedures apply. This remains unchanged from 
he YOA.  
XTRAJUDICIAL (non-court) MEASURES 
 
 
Part 1 of the YCJA outlines 
a framework for the 
imposition of alternative 
approaches in addressing 
less serious youth crime by 
providing meaningful 
consequences other than 
court proceedings. These 
alternative approaches are 
called “extrajudicial 
easures” and reflect the basic premise that 
rimes are different and should be addressed 
ifferently, including responses that do not 
ngage court proceedings. Extrajudicial measures 
re founded on the following principles: 
 they are often the most appropriate/ 
effective way to address youth crime; 
 they allow for effective/timely behavioural 
corrective interventions; and 
 they are presumed to adequately hold the 
youth accountable for their non-violent, first 
time offending behaviour and may be 
adequate in other circumstances.  
 
xtrajudicial measures include alternatives such 
s taking no further action, informal warnings, 
ormal police or Crown cautions, a notice to 
arents, informing victims, referrals to 
official). The objectives of these measures are to 
provide an effective/timely response, encourage 
the repair of harm to and the involvement of the 
victim, the community, and the youth’s family. At 
the same time, the rights of the youth must be 
respected and the measures must be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime.  
 
Extrajudicial Measures Used by the Police 
 
Police officers are often the first to encounter a 
young offender. Bearing in mind the principles of 
extrajudicial measures, under s.6(1) of the YCJA 
a police officer is obligated to consider whether 
it would be appropriate to: 
 
• take no further action; 
• informally warn the youth;  
• administer a formal caution; or  
• refer the youth to a community program or 
agency.  
 
These options must be considered in all cases 
where a charge could be laid. The officer must 
have reasonable grounds to believe an offence has 
been committed. This framework supports the 
police in the use of their discretion when imposing 
extrajudicial measures. 
 
No Further Action 
 
In the case of minor offences, a simple warning to 
the youth may be the most appropriate action to 
take and avoid the need to use police or court 
resources. Other persons like parents or school 
officials may have already taken adequate 
measures to hold the youth accountable for their 
actions. 
 
Informal Warning 
 
Police have always used informal warnings and the 
YCJA supports their continued use in appropriate 
instances. Letting the youth know that their 
offending behaviour is unacceptable and could 
result in further formal action may be a 
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 sufficient deterrent and adequately deal with the 
offence. “Warning” is not defined in the YCJA; 
thus any such warning may be oral or in writing.  
 
Formal Caution 
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Referral 
 
The police may also refer the youth to a 
community program or agency that may help them 
not commit offences. However, in these 
circumstances the consent of the youth is 
mandatory.  
V
Fm 1 
tions 6 and 7 
Youth Criminal Justice Act 
Police Caution to a Young Person 
{name of young person} 
en I have reasonable grounds to believe that you have committed a
inal offence, the Youth Criminal Justice Act requires me, before starting
cial proceedings, to consider taking measures other than going to court. 
e I have reasonable grounds to believe you have committed a criminal
nce, under section 6 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act I am giving you a
al caution. 
u break the law in the future there may be more serious consequences,
uding charges, going to court, and the possibility of serious penalties. 
e} 
ce} 
e of police officer} 
ice department} 
tact # for further information___________________  
 
form of a letter, bridge the gap 
between an informal warning 
and a charge. These cautions 
make it clear to the youth of 
the seriousness of their 
behaviour. However, they must 
not be used in cases where 
aking no further action or an informal warning 
ould be sufficient. Unlike informal warnings, 
olice cautions can only be given if the respective 
rovince establishes a police caution program.  
ample: 
 
Extrajudicial Sanctions 
 
Extrajudicial sanctions, a form of extrajudicial 
measures, may be used if the youth cannot be 
adequately dealt with by taking no further action, 
using an informal police warning, a police or Crown 
caution, or a referral. However, extrajudicial 
sanctions may not be used unless: 
 
• they are authorized by the Attorney General 
or other designated government official; 
• the sanction would be appropriate under the 
circumstances; 
• the youth consents to it and has been advised 
of their right to counsel; 
• the youth accepts responsibility for the 
offence; and 
• there is sufficient evidence to proceed with a 
prosecution which is not in any way barred at 
law. 
 
Where a youth denies participation in the crime 
or desires the charge be heard in Youth Court, an 
extrajudicial sanction may not be used.    
 
Failure of Police to Consider Extrajudicial 
Measures 
 
The failure of a police officer to consider the 
options of extrajudicial measures does not render 
any subsequent charges against the youth invalid 
(s.6(2) YCJA).  
 
Admissions in Extrajudicial Measures 
 
Any admission, confession, or statement by a 
youth accepting responsibility for an offence as a 
condition of being dealt with by extrajudicial 
measures is inadmissible as evidence against the 
youth in any civil or criminal proceeding (s.10(4) 
YCJA).  
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 CONFERENCES  
 
Under s.19 of the YCJA a police officer may 
convene or cause to be convened a conference for 
the purpose of making a decision required under 
the Act, including the need to obtain advice on 
appropriate extrajudicial measures. The Attorney 
General or other designated government official 
is responsible for establishing the rules for 
convening and conducting these conferences.  
 
PARENTAL NOTICE OF ARREST  
 
When a youth is arrested and detained in custody 
for court, the police must, as soon as possible, 
notify the parent orally or in writing of the 
arrest, the place of detention, and the reason 
thereof (s.26(1) YCJA). If the youth is released 
and issued an appearance notice, promise to 
appear, undertaking, or recognizance, the police 
must give or cause to be given to the parent 
notice in writing (s.26(2) YCJA). If the 
whereabouts of the parent is unknown or no 
parent is available, notice may be given to an adult 
relative or other appropriate adult likely to assist 
the youth.  
 
“Parent” is defined in the YCJA as any person who 
is under a legal duty to provide for the youth, or 
who in law or fact has the custody or control of 
the youth, but does not include persons who have 
custody or control by reason only of proceedings 
under the YCJA, such as a police officer or jail 
guard. All notices must include the name of the 
youth, the charge, the time and place of 
appearance, and a statement that the youth has 
the right to be represented by counsel.   
 
Warrants 
 
Warrants issued by a Youth Justice continue to 
be executable anywhere in Canada (s.145 YCJA).  
 
 
 
 
SENTENCES 
 
Under the YOA an adult court 
h
d
c
y
Y
t
o
d
c
 
U
k
s
o
s
m
a
a
C
s
f
t
o
p
t
p
n
A
o
 
I
s
f
 
•
•
•
•
•
•
 
Volume 3 Issue 2 
February/March 2003 transfer hearing would occur 
before the trial and any 
determination of guilt. These 
earings were often complex and once it was 
ecided that the youth would be “raised” to adult 
ourt, they lost the protections available to 
outh. Under the new YCJA, all cases are heard in 
outh Court and it is not until after a conviction 
hat an adult sentence eligibility hearing will 
ccur. This allows the Youth Court to make a 
ecision on an adult sentence after hearing the 
ase at trial. 
nder the YCJA, there are a number of offences 
nown as presumptive offences where an adult 
entence will be given to a youth 14 years or 
lder, unless the youth applies for a youth 
entence. These presumptive offences include 
urder, attempt murder, manslaughter, or 
ggravated sexual assault. In cases of youth who 
re repeat, serious, and violent offenders, the 
rown may give notice to the youth that they are 
eeking an adult sentence on conviction. Upon a 
inding of guilt, the Crown must establish that 
here were at least two prior serious, violent 
ffences. If this is proven, the youth will be 
resumed eligible for an adult sentence unless 
hey apply for a youth sentence. In other non-
resumptive offence cases, the Crown must give 
otice to the youth and the court before a plea. 
n adult sentencing eligibility hearing will then 
ccur after a finding of guilt.  
f a guilty youth does not receive an adult 
entence, s.42 of the YCJA provides that the 
ollowing sanctions may be imposed: 
 reprimand; 
 absolute discharge; 
 conditional discharge; 
 fine not exceeding $1000; 
 monetary compensation for loss, damage, 
injury; 
 restitution; 
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 • compensation through personal service; 
• any prohibition, seizure, or forfeiture order 
(other than s.161 Criminal Code) under any 
federal statute (eg. driving prohibition, 
weapons prohibition); 
• probation not exceeding 2 years; 
• intensive support and supervision 
program order;  
• approved non-residential program not 
exceeding 240 hours over 6 months; 
• custody and supervision not exceeding 2 
years; if offence is one with a life sentence-
custody and supervision not exceeding 3 
years; if offence is a presumptive offence-
custody and supervision not exceeding 3 
years; 
• intensive rehabilitative custody 
order not exceeding 2 years; if offence is one 
with a life sentence-intensive rehabilitative 
order not exceeding 3 years;  
• deferred custody and supervision 
order not exceeding 6 months; 
• if offence is first degree murder-10 years 
(maximum 6 years custody or intensive 
rehabilitative custody plus conditional 
supervision); if offence is second degree 
murder- 7 years (maximum 4 years custody or 
intensive rehabilitative custody plus 
conditional supervision); 
• any other reasonable and ancillary conditions 
the court deems advisable and in the best 
interests of the youth and the public. 
 
OFFENCES 
 
Section 137 YCJA creates a summary conviction 
offence for a youth who willfully fails or refuses 
to comply with a sentence or disposition under the 
Act (such as probation). Section 136 also creates 
hybrid offences with a maximum 2 years 
imprisonment for a person who: 
 
• induces or assists a youth to unlawfully leave a 
place of custody;  
• unlawfully removes a youth from a place of 
custody;  
• knowingly harbours or conceals a youth who 
has unlawfully left a place of custody; 
• willfully induces or assists a youth to breach 
or disobey a condition of their sentence or 
disposition; or  
• willfully prevents or interferes with a youth in 
the performance of a condition of a 
disposition.  
 
RECORDS 
 
Under the YCJA youth records are divided into 3 
categories, each with their own retention, access, 
and disclosure provisions: 
 
• Court records 
• Police records 
• Government or other records 
 
Court Records 
 
Courts or review boards may keep a record of any 
case coming before it or arising under the Act 
(s.114 YCJA). Under s.119(1)(a) a peace officer 
shall be given access to these records for law 
enforcement purposes or any other purpose 
related to the administration of the case to which 
the record relates, unless a youth court judge 
withholds all or part of a report.  
 
Police Records 
 
The police force participating in the investigation 
of an offence alleged to be committed by a youth 
may keep any related record, fingerprints, or 
photographs (s.115 YCJA). When the youth is 
charged with an indictable offence, the police 
may provide a record to the RCMP central 
repository; if convicted the police must provide a 
copy. On request, a police officer may then be 
given access to police records for law 
enforcement purposes or any other purpose 
related to the administration of a case to which 
the record relates (s.119(1) YCJA). Records in 
respect to extrajudicial measures (except 
extrajudicial sanctions) shall only be given to 
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police officers to assist with making a decision on 
appropriate extrajudicial measures, to administer 
the case, or for the purpose of investigating an 
offence (s.119(4) YCJA).  
 
Government or Other Records 
 
Governmental departments or agencies may keep 
records obtained from youth investigations or 
proceedings under the YCJA, when administering 
sentences or court orders, and when considering 
extrajudicial measures, or resulting from the 
application of extrajudicial measures. Similarly, 
other persons or agencies may also keep records 
on youth obtained as a result of extrajudicial 
measures or in administering a youth sentence 
(s.116 YCJA). Peace officers have the same right 
of access to these records as they do to police 
records. 
 
Disclosure 
 
A police officer may disclose information 
contained in a court or police record if disclosure 
is necessary while conducting an investigation of 
an offence (s.125(1) YCJA). Court and police 
records may also be disclosed by the police to a 
foreign state for the purposes of extradition 
(s.125(3) YCJA).  A police officer may also 
disclose court or police record information to an 
insurance company for the purpose of 
investigating a claim arising from an offence 
committed or alleged to have been committed by 
the youth (s.125(4) YCJA). Similarly, a police 
officer may disclose information to any 
professional or other person engaged in the 
supervision or care of a youth, including a school 
representative, to ensure compliance with an 
order of the court, to ensure the safety of staff, 
students, or other persons, or to facilitate the 
youth’s rehabilitation. 
 
Publication 
 
The YCJA continues to 
prohibit the publication of 
a young offender’s name or 
information that may 
identify them, save special 
circumstances. In one such circumstance, a police 
officer may appear ex parte before a youth court 
to get judicial permission for the publication of a 
youth’s identity if there is reason to believe they 
are a danger to others or it will assist in their 
apprehension. 
 
Record Offences 
 
Persons who contravene 
publication, access, or 
disclosure provisions commit a 
hybrid offence punishable by 
up to two years in prison (s.138 
YCJA). 
 
Summary 
 
The above information is by no means intended to 
be an exhaustive review of the YCJA. For more 
information on the Act, go to the Justice 
Department of Canada’s website “YCJA 
Explained” at:  
 
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/yj/repository/index.html 
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